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CONGRESSIONAL RULES OF INTERPRETATION
JARROD SHOBE*

ABSTRACT

Many scholars argue that Congress should adopt federal rules of
statutory interpretation to guide judicial interpretation. This Article
uses a novel dataset to show that Congress has long used enacted
rules of interpretation and has increasingly done so in recent decades. However, it has chosen to do so on a statute-by-statute basis
in a way that has gone mostly unnoticed by scholars and judges. We
developed a dataset by using computer code to search the U.S. Code
dating back to 1946 for specific phrases indicating a rule of interpretation, then manually checked and classified each rule. These rules
not only show that Congress can create interpretive rules, and has
become increasingly likely to do so, but they also call into question
how we should think about the use of judicial canons. Canons are
judge-made interpretive presumptions, and this Article shows that
Congress increasingly includes interpretive rules to the same effect in
the enacted text of its statutes. For example, one of the most important substantive canons of interpretation is the federalism canon,
which tells courts to presume that a federal statute does not preempt
state law absent a clear congressional intent to do so. Yet, Congress
includes hundreds of rules of interpretation in the U.S. Code that
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directly address this same issue. Similarly, Congress directly addresses canons like the presumption against implied repeal, presumptions of consistent usage, and many others in enacted statutes.
This Article's findings should cause judges and scholars to rethink
the use of canons and the justifications for using them.
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INTRODUCTION

Scholars have engaged in an extensive and lively debate over
whether Congress should enact rules of statutory interpretation
that would guide judicial interpretation and the constitutionality of
doing so.' This debate focuses on the creation of a set of interpretive
rules that would apply to the U.S. Code generally and proceeds
under the assumption that Congress has yet to enact rules of interpretation in any meaningful way, with many scholars and judges
claiming that enacted rules of interpretation do not yet exist. 2 As a
result, the debate is treated as purely academic." This Article
refutes the conventional wisdom about enacted rules of interpretation by demonstrating that Congress has long enacted rules of
interpretation throughout the U.S. Code that apply to individual
statutory schemes, and that Congress has enacted these rules more
commonly in recent decades. 4 The debate surrounding enacted rules
of statutory interpretation fails to account for this important fact
about how Congress writes statutes.
1. Compare ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION
OF LEGAL TEXTS 245 (2012) (suggesting that legislated interpretive rules are ''problematic"),
with Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Cammon Law of Statutory Interpretation: Erie for the Age
of Statutes, 54 WM. & MARYL. RRv. 753, 760, 806·07, 811 (2013) [hereinafter Gluck, Federal
Common Law], and Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation:
Methodological Consensus and the New Modi{Wd Textualism, 119 YALEL.J.1750, 1757 (2010)
[hereinafter Gluck, States as Laboratories], and Linda D. Jellum, ''Which Is to Be Master, "ths
Judiciary or the Legislature? When Statutory Directives Vwlate Separation of Powers, 56
UCLAL. REV. 837, 839·42 (2009), and Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory
Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2086 (2002).
2. See, e.g., Rosenkranz, supra note 1, at 2088. One prominent article claims that Congress only enacts such rules "sporadically," and that even when they do, the rules are "at the
periphery of the United Statea Code." Id.; see also Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman,

Statutory Interpretation from the Inside-An Empirieal Study of Congressional Drafting,
Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 1025 (2013) C'Scholars have'"''

haustively debated whether Congress has the power to impose rules of interpretation on the
courts. To our knowledge, however, that debate has not addressed these rules of interpretation that Congress already imposes." (footnote omitted)).
3. See, e.g., ScALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 245 (incorrectly claiming that any discussion of the constitutionality of statute-specific interpretive rules is "academic'' because "the
only common enactments directing judicial interpretation that we are aware of are those prescribing that the provisions of a statute 'are to be liberally construed"').
4. See discussion infra Part II.
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This Article is the fixst empirical study of Congress's use of rules
of interpretation in enacted statutes, or what this Article calls "Congressional Rules of Interpretation."" Although a few scholars have
mentioned the existence of enacted interpretive rules in individual
statutory schemes, no one has studied the scope and content of these
rules across the U.S. Code and across time. Relatedly, no one has
examined what the existence of these rules should mean for how
courts approach statutory interpretation. 6 To fill this gap in
understanding of how Congress creates law, the Author created a
dataset of these rules of interpretation. The Author used computer
code to search various volumes of the U.S. Code over the last
seventy-five years for specific phrases indicating a rule of interpretation, then manually checked and classified each of them. 7 This
process uncovered thousands of rules of interpretation across nearly
every title of the U.S. Code. 8 This Article provides an in-depth study
6. Cf. Gluck, Federal Common Law, supra note 1, at 802 (mentioning the existence of
enacted interpretive rules without categorizing or analyzing these rules).
6. A few scholars have mentioned that individual statutes can contain enacted rules of
interpretation without examining the rules in-depth themselves. See id. (showing that a Westlaw search of the phrase "shall be construed" in the U.S. Code returns more than 5,200 results
of enacted rules of construction, without attempting to categorize or analyze the rules); Cass
R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2071, 2106 (1990)
(''Courts sometimes rely on explicit and implicit interpretive instructions from Congress about
how statutes should be construed. Substantive principles attempt to carry out policies, some
of them with constitutional status, that cannot be tied to any legislative judgment."); id. at
2107 ("Interpretive instructions include, least controversially, explicit legislative guidance
about statutory interpretation. The first provisions of the United States Code provide a long
list of these instructions, and other more particular statutes furnish similar guidance."
(footnote omitted)); see also Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341, 349 (2010) (studying enacted interpretive rules in state codes and
noting that ''legislatures are extremely active when it comes to enacting or refuting canons.
Congress, the legislatures in all fifty states, and the District of Columbia have codified canons
in varying degrees. In this way, legislatures seek to instruct judges on how legislatures
operate and to govern the sources and methods of statutory interpretation.'• (footnote omitted)); Rosenkranz, supra note 1, at 2086 (considering instructions given in individual statutes,
including statutes that ''purport to give interpretive instructions. The class includes prosaic,
definitional provisions such as 'for the purposes of this Act, X shall mean Y,' as well as interpretive instructions like 'this Act shall be construed broadly.' It also includes any codification
or abrogation of a canon of interpretation."); id. at 2088 C'Congress has used this power [to
codify some tools of statutory interpretation] in the past, but only sporadically and unselfconsciously, at the periphery of the United States Code.'').
7. See infra Tables 1 & 2.
8. The only Title of the Code without a rule of interpretation is Title 9, which is only
seven pages long. See infra Table 1.
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of these legislated rules of interpretation and discusses what the
rules and their uses could mean for interpreters. 9
First, this Article argues that when a statute contains enacted
rules of interpretation, those rules should receive the full weight of
law in interpretation. While a set of broadly applicable interpretive
rules that apply to all statutes equally might be viewed as nonbinding on later Congresses, or even an unconstitutional infringement
on the powers of courts, statute-specific rules are less susceptible to
these criticisms. 10 Statute-specific enacted interpretive rules are
Congress's attempt to provide a clear indication of its intended
meaning and scope in enacting the statutory scheme, much like
definition or exception sections that courts apply without question. 11
Yet, despite the status of these rules as enacted law, there is a risk
that courts treat enacted rules of interpretation as "precatory," and
may dismiss them as nonoperative language that is merely advisory
rather than binding, as courts have with other similar provisions. 12
This may be especially true given the fact that these provisions are
often hidden away in small text in notes at the back of the U.S.
Code, or separated from other provisions of an enacted bill when
that bill is codified in various places throughout the U.S. Code. 13
Decisions about how rules of interpretation will appear in the Code
are often not made by Congress, but instead are made by the Office
of the Law Revision Counsel, an unelected body within Congress
responsible for the codification process. 14 This Article argues that
judges should give these enacted rules of interpretation, wherever
they end up in the Code, the full weight oflaw. Therefore, a judge's
analysis of the entire legislative enactment should include enacted
rules, as part of the regularly applied ''whole act rule,'''" to determine an interpretation supported by the entire enacted text. This
approach is more likely to generate an interpretation in line with
9. The full record of the Author's research results are on file with the Author.
10. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2107.
11. See Jarred Shobe, Enacted Legislative Findings and Purposes, 86 U. Cm. L. REv. 669,
691, 712-13 (2019).
12. See id.
13. See infra notes 201-07 and accompanying text.

14. See About the United States Code and This Website, OFF. OF L. REviSION CoUNs.,
http://uscode.house.gov/about_code.xhtml [https1/perma.cdNQX9-HM5J].
15. See Anita S. Krisbnakumar, Cracking the Whole Code Rule, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV. 76, 85
(2021) (defining the whole act rule).
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congressional intent than an approach to interpretation that focuses
on other, unenacted, interpretive tools. 16
This Article's findings are also relevant to the substantial and
ongoing debate over the use of judge-made rules of interpretation,
known as canons. 17 The scholarly literature has generated many
justifications for the use of canons, has challenged the use of canons-both in the aggregate and with respect to specific canons18and has empirically investigated their use by judges. 19 This Article
provides a new perspective on this debate over judicial canons by
showing that Congress often enacts interpretive rules that function
similarly to existing judicial canons. For example, Congress often
enacts provisions stating that a law should not be interpreted to
preempt state law, yet courts apply a similar rule even when a statute is silent on the issue. 2° Congress also often enacts provisions
stating that a statute should not be interpreted to repeal an earlier
statute, which is similar to the commonly used judge-made presumption against implied repeals. 21 And Congress often defines
terms in relation to words in other parts of the statute or even other
16. See, e.g., Rosenkranz, supra note 1, at 2086.

17. See, e.g., SCAIJA&GARNER, supra note 1, at 245; WilliamBaude & Stephen E. Sachs,
The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARv. L. REv. 1079, 1121 (2017) ~'What authority do these
canons have, if any? How would one know whether a proposed canon is real or false? The

competing accounts seem to make these questions harder, and also raise the possibility that
they're ultimately indeterminate."); Andrew Koppehnan, Passive Aggressive: Scalia and
Garner on Interpretation, 41 BOUNDARY 2: AN INT'L J. LITERATURE & CULTURE 227, 229-31
(2014) (providing a disfavorable review and criticism of Scalia and Garner's work); William

N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and Normative Canons, l13 COLUM.L.REv. 531,534-36
(2013) (reviewing Scalia and Garner's book and criticizing Scalia and Garner's analysis of the

canons).
18. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 401-06 (1950) (arguing
that for every canon there is a counter-canon).
19. See Nina A. Mendelson, Change. Creation. and Unpredictability in Statutory Interpretation: Interpretive Canon Use in the Roberts Court$ First Decade, 117 MicH. L. REV. 71.
73-77 (2018); Anita S. Krishna.k.umar, Reconsidering Substantive Canons, 84 U. Cm. L. REv.
825, 828-30 (2017); Anita S. Krishna.k.um.ar, Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts Court's
First Era: An Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis, 62 HAsTINGS L.J. 221, 223-27 (2010); James
J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Warp and Woof of Statutory Interpretation: Comparing
Supreme Court Approaches in Tax Law and Workplace Law, 58 DUKE L.J. 1231, 1233-35

(2009); see also Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 STAN. L.
REV. 999, 1003 (2015) (considering canon use in agency interpretation).
20. See infra Part II.A.1; Gluck & Bressman, supra note 2, at 942.

21. See infra Part II.B.2.
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parts of the Code, yet courts often apply a presumption of consistent
usage of language within a statute and across the Code even when
a statute is silent on Congress's intent. 22
This Article raises novel questions about the use of canons by
asking the following question: How should judges apply judicial
canons in light of the fact that Congress regularly writes similar
interpretive rules directly into statutes and has increasingly done
so in recent decades? This Article's findings should cause judges of
all interpretive leanings to recalibrate the weight they give to
canons, or at least encourage them to be more forthright about what
they are doing when they use canons. If courts still choose to use an
unenacted canon to resolve ambiguous or vague statutory language,
they should at least acknowledge that the canon is serving as a
judicial tool reflecting judicial preferences that are not necessarily
tethered to congressional preferences and practices. 23 This Article's
findings should cause courts and scholars to rethink and make
explicit their justifications for the use of canons, subjecting them to
the criticisms that such us might entail.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I introduces the debates
surrounding enacted rules of statutory interpretation and canons.
Part II provides the results ofthe Author's study, showing the types
of interpretive rules Congress regularly uses and compares them to
their judicial equivalents. Part III explores what enacted rules of
statutory interpretation should mean for statutory interpretation,
discussing both when a statute contains enacted rules and when it
does not.
I. JUDICIAL CANONS AND PROPOSALS FOR CODIFICATION

Judicial canons are a set of judicially created rules and norms
that judges use as tools to interpret statutes, generally when they
find the text otherwise ambiguous or unclear."• These tools allow
judges to use grammar rules, context, and normative values to
22. See infra Part II.B.l.
23. See Richard A. Posner, Statutory lnterpretatio11r-in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 800, 817 (1983).
24. For a comprehensive list of canons, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., PHIT.JP P. FRICKEY,

ELIZABETH GARRETI' & JAMES J. BRUDNEY, CASES AND MATERIAI.S ON LEGISLATION AND
REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 1195-1215 (5th ed. 2014).
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extract meaning from statutory language. 25 Many of these rules
have a long pedigree. 26 This Part does not make extensive efforts to
categorize canons under any specific heading. 27 Instead, this Part
gives a simple introduction to some of the most important types of
canons and summarizes the debate over whether Congress should
enact a set of rules of interpretation akin to canons.
A. Canons

Judicial use of judge-made rules of interpretation is ubiquitous
yet contested among scholars and judges. 28 Courts have adopted
hundreds of judge-made interpretive rules, often referred to as
"canons,'' to attempt to resolve statutory ambiguities. 29 These
25. Seeid.
26. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics and the Maxims of Interpretation, 1990 WIS. L.
REV. 1179, 1183-84, 1187 (demonstrating that modern use of canons can be traced back to
conventions used anciently to construe the Bible, Hindu texts, the Old Testament, and Roman
Law); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTAIUES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 87-92 (photo. reprt.
1966) (1765).
27. These rules are often classified as either linguistic or substantive, although the labels

used vary, and there is some disagreement about which category a particular canon should
fall in. See, e.g., Baude & Sachs, supra note 17, at 1123 (proposing a new system for classifying canons as either "canons of language" or "canons of law'1.
28. Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A Survey
ofForty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts ofAppeals, 131 HARV. L. REv. 1298, 1303-05, 131013 (2018) (discussing the disagreement among camps of judges, congressional staff, and legal
scholars over the use of tools of interpretation). Recent studies have shown a dramatic
increase in the use of canons in Supreme Court statutory opinions. See, e.g., James J. Brudney
& Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 68
VAND. L. REV. 1, 36 (2006) (showing an increase in the use of canons in employment law
cases). Although this Article focuses on enacted rules found in the U.S. Code and their judicial
analogues, judges commonly use similar rules of construction to interpret a variety of legal
texts, including contracts. See, e.g., Horse Creek Conservation Dist. v. State ex rel. Wyo. Att'y
Gen., 221 P.3d 306, 315 (Wyo. 2009) (describing statutory and contract interpretation as
embracing the '~lain meaning'' approach); Thomas v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 749 N.W.2d
678, 683 n.6 (Iowa 2008) ("Cases interpreting language in statutes are persuasive authority
in interpreting contractuallanguage.j; Gentile v. SinglePoint Fin., Inc., 788 A2d 111, 113
(Del. 2001) ("'tis a fundamental principle that the rules used to interpret statutes, contracts,
and other written instruments are applicable when construing corporate charters.''). For
example, under the '"four corners' rule, ... if the meaning of a written contract can be inferred
from its terms, the judicial inquiry stops there; extrinsic evidence ... is inadmissible." Coplay
Cement Co. v. Willis & Paul Grp., 983 F.2d 1435, 1438 (7th Cir. 1993).
29. WILLI.-IM N. ESKRIDGE JR., ABBE R. GLUCK & VICTORIA F. NOUBSE, STATUTES,
REGULATION, AND INTERPRETATION: LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF

STATUTES 1195-1215 (2014).
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canons are deployed by both textualists and purposivists in nearly
every statutory interpretation decision, often in majority and dissenting opinions that use a variety of canons to argue in favor of
each side's preferred interpretation_ so Canons have grown in importance in recent years, 31 likely due to the rise of textualism in
statutory interpretation, which gives canons a privileged place in
interpretation. 82
Canons can be divided into textual or linguistic canons, which
serve to help uncover the linguistic meaning of the text, and substantive canons, which provide a judicial presumption in favor of a
particular outcome based on values that a court decides should be
protected or emphasized. 33 Textual canons generally reflect common
usage of the English language, thereby allowing a judge to uncover
what Congress likely intended in the words it used. 34 For example,
the rule against surplusage states that every word or phrase of a
statute should be given effect, 86 the ejusdem generis canon states
that a court should interpret a general term used at the end of a list
to share the characteristic of the preceding words in the list,"6 and
the expressio unius canon presumes that the inclusion of some
30. See Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons andFaithfulAgency, 90 B. U. L. REv. 109,
116 (2010) (asserting that all interpreters use substantive canons of interpretation).
31. See, e.g., Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 28. at 30-35 (documenting the increased use
of language canons and substantive canons with the rise oftextualism on the Supreme Court).
32. See, e.g., Gluck & Posner, supra note 28, at 1311-12.
33. This terminology is not used consistently, although the concepts are generally the
same. See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 30, at 117 (classifying canons as "either linguistic or
substantivej; Caleb Nelson, Statutory Interpretation and Decision Theory, 74 U. CHI. L. REv.
329, 356 (2007) (reviewing ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTI-

TUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2006)) (describing some canons as helping un-

cover "a statute's intended meaning" and others as reflecting normative values that underlie
"our Constitution or other aspects of our legal traditions"); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip

P. Frickey, Foreword: Law and Equilibrium, 108 HARv. L. REV. 26, 63 (1994) (referring to

"textual," '1-eferential," and "substantive" canons).
34. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 29, at 643; JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C.
STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: CASESANDMATERIAI1l202 (2d ed. 2013) (noting
that "semantic" canons "are generalizations about how the English language is conventionally
used and understood"). Not all observers agree that they do a good job of reflecting actual language usage. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory

Interpretation, 66 U. Cm. L. REV. 671, 676 (1999) ("Although (inclusio unius] is one of the most

frequently invoked linguistic canons, it strikes me as an unreliable rule of thumb about the
ordinary use oflanguage.").
35. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 174.

36. Id. at 199·201.
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things in a list implies the exclusion of others. 87 Many other textual
canons assume continuity in congressional enactments. For example, one of the most important textual canons is the presumption of
consistent usage, or that ''identical words used in different parts of
the same act are intended to have the same meaning." 38 The whole
code rule is a corollary to this rule that assumes words are used consistently across the entire U.S. Code rather than just within a
particular statutory scheme. 39 Because all of these canons are meant
to reflect how judges believe language is ordinarily used, courts
rarely feel the need to justify using textual canons on any basis
other than that they help uncover what Congress is most likely to
have meant. 40
In contrast, substantive canons place a thumb on the scale in
favor of a policy external to the statute that courts identify as
desirable. 41 Perhaps the best known substantive canon is the rule of
lenity, which requires courts to interpret ambiguous criminal
statutes in favor of criminal defendants. 42 Another example is the
federalism canon, which instructs courts to interpret statutes in
37. Id. at 107. Although these tools are supposed to be policy-neutral reflections of how
an average person would use language, they can sometimes create conflicts even between

Supreme Court Justices. Compare Lockhart v. United States, 577 U.S. 347, 349-52 (2016)

(Justice Sotomayor advocating for the rule of the last antecedent), with id. at 362-64 (Kagan,
J., dissenting) (advocating that the application of the series-qualifier canon better reflects
"ordinary understanding of how English works").
38. Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990); see also Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy
Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 232 (2007); Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995). But
see Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417 & n.3 (1992).
39. See, e.g., FDA v. Browo & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132-33 (2000)
(Justice O'Connor explaining that ambiguity only becomes clear ''when placed in context'');

Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865, 873-74 (1999) (Justice Kennedyfmdiog
that the meaning of a disputed term could only be understood in context of other relevant congressional acts); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 164-66 (1997) (Justice Scalia clarifying the
disputed term by "compar[ing it] with the language Congress ordinarily uses"); W. Va. Univ.

Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 99-101 (1991) (Justice Scalia relying on the use oftbe terms

"attorney's fees" and "expert fees" in federal statutes throughout the U.S. Code).

40. See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, Whatls Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 383 (2005) (justifying
noscitur a sociis and expressio unius canons on the ground that j'they reflect ordinary principles that laymen as well as lawyers use to interpret communications").
41. Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103HARv. L. REV. 405,
457 (1989).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157, 172-73 (2014) (decliniog to apply
the ruleoflenity because the statute was not su:fiJ.ciently ambiguous); United States v. Santos,
553 u.s. 507, 513-14 (2008).
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ways that protect state sovereignty and maintain a balance between
federal and state governments.•• These substantive canons do not
attempt to give literal meaning to the text because the text is generally silent as to the subject the canon addresses.•• Instead, these
canons enforce norms that are not explicit in the statutory text. 45
Judges claim several justifications for relying on canons. Some
claim that canons reflect likely congressional preferences because
the canons comprise a set of long-established rules that Congress
must be aware of and draft in light of.'6 Other judges use canons to
encourage Congress to draft more precisely, 47 or at least to provide
a useful ''background rule oflaw against which Congress can legislate."48 Others claim that canons improve the coherency and efficiency of the law or protect certain underenforced constitutional
norms or policy preferences,•• whether or not those are the goals of
43. E.g., Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 755 (2004).

44. See Barrett, supra note 30, at 109-10.
46. See Sunstein., supra note 41, at 457.
46. See John F. Manning, Textualism cmd the Equity of the Statute, 101 CoLUM. L. REv.
1, 113 (2001) ("Modern legislatures ... pass such statutes against deeply embedded 'norms of
interpretation and defense,' which frame the social understanding of such statutes, just as
rules of grammar and diction do." (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, The Case of the Speluncean
Explorers: Revisited, 112 HARv. L. REv. 1913, 1914 (1999))); see also McNary v. Haitian
Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479,496 (1991); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677,699 (1979)
(''[I]t is not only appropriate but also realistic to presume that Congress was thoroughly familiar with ... unusually important precedents ... and that it expected its enactment to be interpreted in conformity with them."); MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 34, at 202 ("It is
possible to conceive of [substantive] canons as representing generic approximations of congressional intent/'); ANToNIN SCALIA, A MA'ITER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW 25-27 (1997).
47. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 61 C'The canons influence not just how courts
approach texts but also the techniques that legal drafters follow in preparing those texts.");
Nelson, supra note 40, at 381-82; Willia.m. D. Popkin, An "Intemaln Critique of Justice Scalia's
Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1133, 1143 (1992).
48. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DUKE L.J. 511, 517; see Lockhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 142, 148 (2005) (Scalia, J., ooncurring) ("[L]egi.slative express-reference or express-statement requirements may function as
background canons of interpretation of which Congress is presumptively aware."); AT&T
Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 397 (1999) ("Congress is well aware that the ambiguities it chooses to produce in a statute will be resolved by the implementing agency.''); see
also Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S.
519, 531 n.22 (1983) ("Congress ... appear[s] to have been generally aware that the statute
would be construed by common-law courts in accordance with traditional canons.''); John F.
Manning, Continuity and the Legislative Design, 79 NOTRE DAME L_ REV_ 1863, 1864·65
(2004).
49. See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. Cm. L. REV. 315, 320 (2000);
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Congress. 50 Yet others argue that certain substantive canons serve
to enhance the power of underrepresented groups by forcing Congress to consider those groups more explicitly when creating legislation. 51
Courts often apply canons without providing any justification
beyond the fact that canons exist and have been used before, and
therefore are ingrained in how statutes are drafted and read. 52
Many criticize the textual and substantive canons as either expecting too much of Congress or poorly reflecting congressional
intent, noting that Congress is disproportionately likely to override cases relying on these canons. 53 Some scholars criticize the
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & PhilipP. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement
Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 597 (1992); David L. Shapiro,
Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 936-37 (1992).
50. See EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR LEGISLATION 235 (2008); Gluck, States as Laboratories, supra note 1, at 1757; Amanda L. Tyler,
Continuity, Colwrence, and tlw Canons, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1389, 1418·21 (2005); Eskridge &
Frickey, supra note 33. at 66-67. John Manning criticizes this idea on the grounds that it
provides unbounded protection for these constitutional values, which were always intended
to be bounded. See John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 CoLUM.
L. REv. 399, 445 (2010) (arguing that substantive canons "sacrifice the idea that constitutional
values ... are intelligible only in [a framework] that defines their reach and limits'').
51. See, e.g., ELHAUGE, supra note 50, at 153, 190 (arguing that canons can force Congress
to reveal its legislative preferences); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 16-17 (2007) (arguing that interpretive default rules like canons can force Congress to give more deliberation
to the interests of poorly represented groups); see also Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The
Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARv. L. REV. 593, 621
(1995).
52. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 50. at 411 ("[T]he nonretroactivity canon might fmd an
independently sufficient justification in its claim to an ancient pedigree.''); Barrett, supra note
30, at 110; Thomas W. Merrill, Faithful Agent. Integrative, and Welfarist Interpretation, 14
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1565, 1596-97 (2010); SCAUA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 31 (arguing
that certain rules, like the rule of lenity, are "so deeply ingrained, [they] must be known to
both drafter and reader ali.k.e so that they can be considered inseparable from the meaning
of the text"). Not all observers agree that pedigree alone validates a canon. See, e.g., Harold
Hongju Koh, Commentary, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111liARv. L. REV. 1824,
1852-53 (1998) (observing that opponents of the use of international law norms acknowledge
their long-standing application but still reject the norms themselves).
53. Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967-2011, 92 TEx. L. REv. 1317, 1405-06
(2014) (finding that decisions relying on the whole code rule make up nearly one-quarter of
Supreme Court decisions that are overridden by Congress even though only 8 percent of all
statutory interpretation decisions rely on the rule, and that decisions relying on the whole act
rule make up more than 40 percent of all Supreme Court decisions that are overridden by
Congress even though only 10 percent of all statutory interpretation decisions rely on the
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inconsistency with which courts apply the canons, which they argue makes it difficult for readers of statutes to predict a judicial
outcome. 54 Some have questioned whether it is realistic to expect
congressional drafters to know and follow all of the canons. 55
Moreover, Professors Abbe Gluck and Lisa Bressman's interviews
with congressional staffers indicate that many canons do not reflect
how Congress writes statutes. 56
B. Codifying Rules of Interpretation

In response to many of the criticisms about the use of canons,
including the unpredictability of their application and lack of connection to Congress, some scholars propose that Congress take the
lead by telling courts which canons they want applied and which
ones they do not. 57 Indeed, some propose that Congress enact a
"Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation'' to guide judicial interpretation of all laws, 58 using legislated interpretive rules in the
states as possible guides. 59
These proposals generated an extensive debate about benefits
of federally legislated interpretive rules60 and whether such rules
rule); William W. Buzbee, The One-Congress Fiction in Statutory Interpretation, 149 U. PA.
L. REV. 171, 234-40 (2000).
54. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 676 (1990)

(arguing that the selective use of canons "will often be more arbitrary and less constraining
than that of the traditional approach'').
55. Posner, supra note 23, at 806 ("We should demand evidence that statutory draftsmen
follow the code before we erect a method of interpreting statutes on the improbable assumption that they do.'); Eskridge, supra note 17, at 669 (arguing that, in READING LAw: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS, Scalia and Garner make no attempt to investigate whether
their preferred canons are known by,let alone approved by, congressional drafters).
56. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 2, at 954-55.
57. Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellytv--Should Congress Turn Its
Lonely Eyes to You?, 46 VAND. L. REV. 661, 666, 677 (1992) ~'The only way for Congress to
prevent the continued use of normative canons with which it disagrees is to enact an amendment to Title I of the United States Code that expressly provides for different rules of construction.").
58. E.g., Rosenkranz, supra note 1, at 2156-57.
59. See Scott, supra note 6, at 350. Scott's study of state codified canons only examined
"rules of interpretation that govern a polity's entire legal system.'' because he wanted a
"reliable means of comparison across states." ld. at 361 n.36.
60. Jellum, supra note 1, at 846-47 ("[S]ome legal scholars, like Nicholas Rosenkranz and
Stephen Ross, have urged Congress to [regulate statutory interpretation]. But they are misguided; this issue is one for the judiciary to resolve, not the legislature." (footnote omitted)).
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would pass constitutional muster."' Most scholars argue that such
a set of interpretive rules-or at least certain types of those ruleswould unconstitutionally infringe on judicial power. 62 Laurence
Tribe argues that, if judges were to adhere to "previously enacted
legislative 'rules' of construction," then they "would in a sense
permit an earlier Congress to add to art. I's requirements for the enactment of laws by a later Congress." 68 Tribe argues that a subsequent Congress should be free to use its preferred interpretive
approach without being bound by a prior Congress's rules of interpretation."• Similarly, Larry Alexander and Saikrishna Prakash
argue that Congress cannot alter the constitutional requirements
for the creation of law. 66 For example, they argue that "Congress
does not have any generic right to pass legislation that requires
future Congresses to utter certain words or phrases if it wishes to
overcome the prior Congress's rules of interpretation" and, more
colorfully, that Congress cannot require "future Congresses to bark
like seals prior to legislating." 66 Scalia and Garner argue that
legislatively enacted rules of interpretation would likely ''be an
intrusion upon the courts' function of interpreting the laws." 67 For
these reasons, others argue that "if push came to shove, [federal

61. See, e.g., Rosenkranz, supra note 1, at 2156-57.
62. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 2162, 2203-05 (2002) (suggesting that legislative attempts to opt out of the rule oflenity
violate courts' interpretive authority); see also id. at 2108-11 (discussing constitutional

limitations on enacted rules of interpretation). This constitutional argument can be based on
the famous declaration in Marbury v. Madison: ''It is emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department to aay what the law is." 5 U.S. (1 Craoch) 137, 177 (1803); see also
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 404 (Alexaoder Hamilton) (Benjamio E. Wright ed., 1961) CThe
interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts.").
63. 1 LAURENCE H. TRiBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 125 n.1 (3d ed. 2000).
64. ld.
66. Larry Alexaoder & Saikrishna Prakash, Mother May I? Imposing Mandatory Prospective Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 20 CONST. COMMENT 97, 98 (2003) ("Artificial rules
of interpretation laid down in advance that do not reflect subsequent usages or intentions
should not be allowed to trump the actual meaning of statutes.'').
66. Id. at 105-06. As Christian Turner notes, no one suggests a problem exists in the
congressional requirement, codified in 1 U.S.C. § 101, that enacted laws must begin with the
language: "Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled." Christian Turner, Submarine Statutes, 55 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 185, 193 n.35 (2018).
67. SCAIJA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 245.
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judges] would probably hold many binding interpretive rules unconstitutional."""
Others make policy-based arguments, maintaining that a set of
federal rules of statutory interpretation would be unworkable, and
ultimately, more trouble than they would be worth. One policy
objection is that enacted ''interpretive statutes ... may bind future
Congresses excessively, forcing them to jump through specific
textual hoops to achieve legislative goals." 69 Others point to the fact
that judges would need to subject the interpretive rules themselves
to judicial interpretation to determine whether and how the rules
would apply to a particular circumstance. 70 Glen Staszewski raises
several issues concerning the application of enacted interpretive
rules, including how judges should reconcile enacted rules with
other widely accepted interpretive principles and how judges should
handle potential conflicts, especially when evidence of legislative
intent exists that contradicts the earlier-enacted interpretive rule. 71
These scholars ultimately argue that courts are unlikely to allow
interpretive rules to bind their decision-making, and instead, will
find reasons to justify not applying the rules when doing so would
result in an interpretation with which they disagree. 72
A minority of commentators seem to think that enacted legislative rules create no problem. Cass Sunstein reasons that "[t]he
easiest cases ... involve express legislative instructions about interpretation .... When the legislature has been explicit, there can be
no objection to judicial use of the relevant instructions." 78 Nicholas
Rosenkranz wrote the most prominent article in defense of both the
constitutionality and wisdom of congressional enacted rules of
68. Glen Staszewski, The Dumbing Down of Statutory Interpretation, 95 B.U. L. REv. 209,
267 (2015).
69. Rosenkranz, supra note 1, at 2120 (referencing Professor Tribe's objection to

interpretive rules in the McCarran-Ferguson Act and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
70. See Alan R. Romero, Note, Interpretive Directions in Statutes, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
211, 228 (1994); Andrew Tutt, Comment, Interpretation Step Zero: A Limit on Methodology
as "Law, n 122 YALE L.J. 2055, 2058 (2013); Staszewski, supra note 68, at 265.
71. Staszewski, supra note 68, at 266-67. Tribe similarly argues that all "rules of construction contained in the United States Code" may be trumped by "other interpretive indicia." Tru:BE, supra note 63, at 125 n.l.
72. Staszewski, supra note 68, at 266-67.

73. CABS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY

STATE 153 (1990).
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interpretation. 74 Rosenkranz's arguments mostly center on the idea
that as long as a future Congress can amend an earlier Congress's
interpretive rules, subsequent Congresses are not actually bound by
the earlier Congress. 75 Rosenkranz also argues that the idea that
courts can create rules of interpretation, but Congress cannot, is "an
untenable endorsement of imperial judging."76
Although it is not always clear because commentators often
speak in generalities, this debate seems to primarily focus on the
constitutionality of enacting a set of interpretive rules applicable to
the entire body of current and future U.S. laws, not the constitutionality of a statute-by-statute approach to creating interpretive
rules. 77 Some of those who seem skeptical of the constitutionality
of a generally applicable set of enacted rules of statutory interpretation concede that interpretive rules applicable to a specific statutory scheme are unlikely to raise constitutional issues, even as
they assume that rules that apply only to a specific statutory
scheme rarely, if ever, exist. 78 For example, Scalia and Garner state,
"[w]hen [an enacted rule of interpretation] applies to interpretation
of only the statute in which it is contained, it can amount to nothing
74. See generally Will Baude, The (Unwritten) Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation,
WASH. PosT (Aug. 4, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/newslvolokh-conspiracylwpl
2016/08/04/the-unwritten-fed.eral-rules-of-sta.tutory-interpretation/ [https://perma.cc/XD2XGRSKJ (discussing the fame and importance of Rosenkranz's article).
75. Rosenkranz, supra note 1, at 2111.
76. Id. at 2119.
77. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 245 (arguing that a set of interpretive rules
that applies to all statutes is "more likely to be an intrusion upon the courts' function of
interpreting the laws, rather than an exercise of the legislature's power to clarify the meaning
of its product'); John F. Manning, Putting Legislative History to a Vote: A Response to Pro/eBBor Siegel, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1529, 1532 (2000) ("Congress can and does pass interpretation
acts prescribing general rules of construction to govern future enactments.''); Jonathan R.
Siegel, The Use of Legislative History in a System of Separated Powers, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1457,
1490 n.181 (2000) ("Congress rarely adopts legislation containing general instructions for the
interpretation of statutes.").
78. E.g., SCALIA&GARNER, supra note 1, at 244; Gluck, Federal Common Law, supra note
1, at 764 (discussing canons and claiming that "Congress has not formally adopted any of
these presumptions (for example, by statute or internal rule)"); Mark Tushnet, The "Constitution Restoration Act" and Judicial Independence: Some Observations, 66 CASE W. RsRV.
L. REV. 1071, 1077 n.27 (2006) ('Methodological directives with respect to statutes seem to
me more like provisions intrinsic to the statutes themselves, and in light of the obvious congressional power to prescribe a statute's terms (and so its meaning), congressional power to
prescribe interpretive methods seems to me to follow.").
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more than the legislature's clarification of the statute's meaning." 79
Yet, Scalia and Garner also incorrectly claim that this debate is "ac·
ademic" because "the only common enactments directing judicial
interpretation that we are aware of are those prescribing that the
provisions of a statute 'are to be liberally construed."''"
For their part, courts seem to rely on statute-specific rules of
interpretation to some degree without raising constitutional concerns. 81 The arguments against the constitutionality of enacted rules
of interpretation seemingly apply with much less force to more constrained rules of interpretation that purport only to guide the
interpretation of a specific statutory regime rather than the entire
Code."2 To attempt to say what does and does not constitute an
interpretive rule in a particular statute could cause line-drawing
problems because all kinds of enacted provisions could arguably be
classified as interpretive and, therefore, unconstitutional. For example, are definitions that apply to an individual statute interpretive rules that encroach on the judicial power to "say what the law
is"?83 What about exception sections that attempt to carve out
certain things from a statute?
Congress needs leeway to clarify and constrain the meaning of
each statute to draft legislation that accurately captures what Congress hopes to achieve. So, while a generally applicable set of enacted statutory interpretation rules might cause constitutional
issues, this Article proceeds under the assumption that statutespecific interpretive provisions are a constitutional use of Congress's
legislative power.

79. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 244.
80. See id. at 245; Gluck, Federal Common Law, supra note 1, at 804.
81. See Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2107.
82. Compare SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 245 ("[I]nterpretative com.mand[s]
applicable to all statutes [are] ... problematic."), and Manning, supra note 50, at 427 (claiming
that enacted interpretative rules are most problematic because "they enforce ... values as
abstracted from the specific provisions that implement those values"), with id. (finding that
ignoring statute-specific enacted rules ignores the lawmaking "process of compromise ... [that]
entail[a] making hard decisions about means as well as ends").
83. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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II. ENACTED RULES OF INTERPRETATION

One ofthis Article's most important contributions is to show that
scholars have overlooked the fact that Congress regularly enacts
rules of interpretation and that many of these enacted rules are
similar to many of the interpretive canons judges commonly use.
This Article also shows that this is not a new phenomenon, and the
use of enacted rules of interpretations has been on the rise for many
decades. This Part describes many of the most important canons of
interpretation and their use in enacted statutes.
As explained in greater detail in the Appendix, the Author and
his research assistants uncovered enacted rules of interpretation
by conducting several different searches in the U.S. Code. The
Author searched the 1946, 1970, 1994, and 2017 versions of the U.S.
Code to track the use of enacted rules of interpretation over time. 84
The Author chose 2017 because it was the most recent available
version of the Code and chose the other years of the Code in an attempt to go back far enough to capture trends in the evolution of the
Code. Because the Code changes slowly as Congress adds and takes
away from it each year, 85 the Author believed it was most helpful to
look at years of the Code with sufficient separation to show significant change. 86
To conduct the searches, we created a program using Python
3.0 software that reads all titles of each year of the Code and
searched the text of each title for the phrases "construe," "rule(s) of
84. See infra Tables 2-5.
85. See, e.g., RICHARD A BAKER, TRADITIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE (2007),

https:l/www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdffl'raditions.pdf[https:l/perrna.cd2ESS-V5Z4].
86. The Author chose the speci:flc years used in this study because the Government
Printing Office (GPO) publishes new editions of the Code every six years, and publishes
annual supplements in the intervening years. The GPO published new editions in 1946, 1970,
and 1994. ABOUT THE UNITED STATES CODE AND TEnS WEBSITE, supra note 14. The O:filCe of
the Law Revision Counsel (OLRC) also maintains an online version of the Code that is up to
date as of the date provided on their website. Currency and Updating, OFF. OF L. REVISION
COUNS., http://uscod.e.house.gov/currency/currency.shtml

[https://perma.cc/DKZ5-XD99].

Versions of the Code dating back to 1994 are available through the GPO's website. About the
United States Code, GOVINFO, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/collectionUScode.action?col
lectionCode=USCODE [https:l/perma.cc/7TAL-TMVP]. For a deeper discussion of the codification process, see generally Jarrod Shobe, Codification and the Hidden Work of Congress, 67
UCLA L. REv. 640 (2020).
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construction,'' ''rule(s) of interpretation,'' and ''interpreted,'' ignoring
case in each instance. We also did a series of more targeted searches
in each year of the Code for particular rules of interpretation that
use unusual words (like "severability"), and then manually weeded
out false positives. 87 This yielded many additional rules of interpre·
tation for each year. We put the results of all these searches into a
spreadsheet containing the title number, section heading, and text
of each rule of interpretation. For the 2017 Code, we entered a
symbol indicating whether Congress codified the rule in the notes
or the body of the Code. We then sorted through this file to weed out
false positives and to sort the rules into groups of rules similar to
judicial canons. While many of these enacted interpretive rules were
specific to the statute and did not match a judicial canon, a significant portion of the rules did address similar issues as a common
judicial canon would. This Part focuses on those enacted rules of
interpretation.
In the 2017 Code, these rules of construction appear in thousands
of different sections and in all but one title. 88 The rules appear, on
average, in about one of every three pages of the 2017 Code. By
using trial-and-error, we determined the searches most likely to
return the types of rules of interpretation we sought. Although we
attempted to be as thorough as possible, our search methodology
undoubtedly missed some rules of interpretation because of the
variety oflanguage Congress uses to express similar concepts, which
makes it impossible to find every rule without reading the Code all
the way through. 89 However, we believe that our results capture a
87. We performed the following searches of the 2017 version of the U.S. Code in a similar
manner to the way that we searched the Code for rules of construction: searching "private
right of action" or "private remedies"; 4'common law"; "has the meaning" or "have the meaning''; "severability/' "held invalid," "unenforceable," or "separability"; and ''sovereign immunity."
88. See infra Table 1. Title 9 of the Code was the only Title that did not contain any rules
of construction under the Author's searches. This is not surprising because Title 9 is only
seven pages long.
89. There is also uncertainty about what even qualifies as a rule of construction. This
Article focuses on provisions that relate to common judicial canons because those are most
clearly understood to be interpretive rules, but there are certainly many other kinds of provisions that could be considered interpretive rules. Additionally, our searches only provide a
snapshot of the U.S. Code at the time we did the searches. The Code is constantly changing,
although the pace of change is generally slow given the size of the Code and the slow rate at
which Congress enacts new laws. We did not attempt to look at when these rules were
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significant majority of enacted rules of interpretation that relate to
judicial canons and allow us to make useful observations about how
Congress has used these rules over time. Table 1 and Table 2 below
summarize our findings. We provide more detail for rules enacted
in 2017 because the 2017 Code provides a view into current use of
these rules. However, because Congress reorganized the titles of the
Code various times over the last seventy years, comparisons between years are difficult on this point. Further data is presented in
following Sections.

enacted or how they have changed over time. Although a historical analysis of the rise of the
use of these rules is worthy of future examination, it is beyond the scope of this Article.
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Table 1. Enacted Rules of Interpretation, by 2017 U.S. Code Title
Title

Pages

No. of Rules of
Interpretation

Title

Pages

No. of Rules of
Interpretation

1

17

2

28

637

107

2

606

118

29

875

224

3

64

24

30

365

91

4

21

7

31

512

119

5

1,143

304

32

52

14

6

368

282

33

864

184

7

2,108

264

34

544

118

8

568

167

35

140

19

9

7

0

36

315

12

10

2,967

733

37

273

32

11

316

40

38

1,104

184

12

1,955

530

39

127

37

13

36

7

40

258

50

14

166

21

41

162

64

15

2,218

682

42

8,137

1,946

16

2,435

445

43

597

171

17

205

69

44

173

48

18

872

279

45

271

36

19

1,124

156

46

488

57

20

1,649

465

47

396

214
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886

290

48

350

65

22

1,936

370

49

1,445

326

23

389

90

50

997

314

24

46

2

51

146

41

25

716

157

52

136

35

26

3,952

606

53

N/A

N/A

27

20

11

54

161

17

Total

46,315

10,646

Table 2. Total Enacted Rules of Interpretation per Year
1946

1970

1994

2017

2,180

2,268

4,142

10,646

A. Substantive Canons
As discussed above, substantive canons are not policy neutral.
These canons aim to privilege certain interpretations over others. 90
This Section discusses a number of enacted provisions similar to
these canons that regularly appear in legislation.

90. See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 30, at 110.
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Table 3. Enacted Rules of Interpretation in the U.S. CodeSubstantive Canons
1946

1970

1994

2017

Federalism

145

225

524

887

International Law

20

25

38

83

Indian Law

25

38

131

246

Type of Rule of Interpretation

1. Federalism Canons

One of the most important and long-standing sets of substantive
canons enforces the values of federalism. 91 Federalism canons aim
to interpret ambiguous statutes in a way that does not preempt or
interfere with state law absent a clear congressional intent to do
so. 92 These canons are based on the premise that "Congress does not
readily interfere'' with the powers retained by the states under the
Constitution. 98 Whether and how to apply preemption is one of the
most important and hotly contested questions in interpretation
because it determines whether the federal government or states
control the law in many politically controversial areas. 94
91. See Jamelle C. Sharpe, Legislating Preemption, 53 WM. & MARY L. REv. 163, 167
(2011). For example, the Supreme Court applied a version of the preemption canon in 1821.
See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 443 (1821) C'To interfere with the penal laws
of a State ... is a very serious measure, which Congress cannot be supposed to adopt lightly,
or inconsiderately. The motives for it must be serious and weighty."). Many early cases did
not mention this canon, however. See Barrett, supra note 30, at 153 & n.211 ("[T]he
presumption against preemption of state law seems not to have become an established part
of the interpretive lexicon until the latter half of the nineteenth century.").

92. Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 858 (2014) C1t has long been settled ... that we

presume federal statutes do not abrogate state sovereign immunity, impose obligations on
the States pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, or preempt state law." (cita.-

tionsomitted)); Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005); Gregoryv. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452,475, 478 (1991); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,223,241 (1947);
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 290 ("[I]t iB a reliable canon of interpretation ... to presume
that a federal statute does not preempt state law."); Gluck & Bressman, supra note 2, at 942.
93. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 461. Interestingly, Manniog argues that the Constitution does
not endorse ''federalism" per se but instead reconciles "competing values about the appropriate sphere of state authority." Manning, supra note 50, at 433 (emphasis omitted).
94. Sharpe, supra note 91, at 166 C'[T]he enormity of the stakes in preemption cases [is]
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The Author's searches uncovered nearly one thousand examples
in the 2017 U.S. Code, and many instances from earlier editions of
the Code, in which Congress enacted a federalism rule of interpretation stating that a statute should not be interpreted to preempt
state laws. 95 For instance, many statutes simply say: "Nothing in
this chapter shall be construed to preempt any State law." 96 Others
target specific state laws: "Nothing in this Section shall be construed as waiving applicable State requirements relating to licensing of pharmacies," 97 and ''Nothing in this section shall be
construed to limit any prior, current, or future efforts of any State
to establish any alternative to tort litigation." 98 These rules of
interpretation codify what judges already often do even in the
absence of such a rule. ••
While most of the searches revealed enacted presumptions
against preempting state laws, some examples explicitly stated that
the federal law should apply notwithstanding any state law. For
example, one statute states that it "shall supersede any and all
State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan,'' 100 and another says that rules different than
those under the Act "may not be imposed by any State." 101 This
shows that Congress is not only capable of enacting rules that avoid
preemption, but that it is also able to clearly state when it wants
state laws preempted. More than any other enacted rules uncovered
by this study, it appears that Congress is aware of and regularly
accounts for federal legislation's effect on state laws.
This raises the question of why state-related interpretive rules
feature so prominently in the U.S. Code, both past and present. It
unmistakably clear: preemption determines which level of government-federal or state--gets
to control regulatory policy in a complex federal system.").
95. See supra Table 3.
96. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(h).
97. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-3b(6).
98. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 280g-15(1).
99. See generally Sharpe, supra note 91, at 166-72. Professor Gluck made a similar
observation about one preemption clause: 4'After all, how different is ERISA's 'savings clause,'
which states that 'nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any
person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities,' from the
presumption against preemption?'' Gluck, Federal Common Law, supra note 1. at 803
(footnote omitted).
100. 29 u.s.c. § 1144(•)101. 21 u.s.c. § 678.
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is, of course, difficult to know why Congress chooses to draft laws
the way it does. The most plausible explanation is a combination of
drafter awareness and state lobbying. 102 In their study, Professors
Abbe Gluck and Lisa Bressman interviewed legislative drafters who
showed a better understanding of rules against preemption than
many other canons, even if the drafters did not always agree with
how courts apply those canons. 103 Perhaps the drafters' awareness
has translated to more targeted drafting of provisions to ensure that
congressional intent regarding preemption is clear. 104 Debates about
the division of legal authority between state and federal governments date back to the founding, 105 so it makes sense that Congress
has been thinking about federalism concerns for a long time when
drafting statutes.
2. International Law Canons

Other enacted rules of interpretation that appear in the U.S. Code
relate to international or foreign law. For example, the Charming
Betsy canon, named after a Supreme Court decision more than two
centuries old, 106 states that courts should construe ambiguous
congressional statutes in a manner consistent with international
law .107 This canon has been the subject of extensive debate.'"" In
102. See generally, e.g., Eric Crosbie & Laura A. Schmidt, Preemption in Tobacco ControL·
A Framework for Other Areas of Public Health, 110 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 345, 345 (2020).

103. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 2, at 927.
104. See JAY B. SYKEs & NICOLE VANATKO, CONG. RscH. SERV., R46826, FEDERAL
i'REEMPI'ION: A LEGAL PRIMER 1-6 (2019) (discussing the uncertainty of reliance on the presumption against preemption and supplying drafters with the tools necessary to enact explicit
federalism rules). Additionally, perhaps states serve as a successful interest group in the
drafting process, either directly through review of proposed legislation or through influence
of elected officials.
106. See Gary Gerstle, The New Federalism, THE ATLANTIC (May 6, 2020), https:/lwww.
theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/06/new-federalism/611077/ [https://perma.cc/6LY6-47ED].
106. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804). Although this canon
derives its name from the Charming Betsy case, courts used a similar rule of interpretation
in a number of earlier cases. See Barrett, supra note 30, at 134-35 (citing Jones v. Walker, 13
F. Cas. 1059, 1064 (Jay, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Va. 1800) (No. 7507); Talbotv. Seeman, 5 U.S.
(1 Craoch) 1, 43 (1801)).
107. See, e.g., Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations v. City of New York, 651
U.S. 193, 199-200 (2007); Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 358 (1995); Weinberger v.
Rossi, 456 U .8. 25, 32 (1982) (invoking canon that "an act of congress ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains" (quoting
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order to respect international law and protect the authority of the
political branches in foreign relations, Charming Betsy functions to
require courts to interpret statutes not to violate international law,
absent clear congressional intent to do so. 109 The Author uncovered
nine instances in the 2017 U.S. Code in which Congress enacted
language aimed at a similar concept. For example, statutes say,
"[t]his chapter shall be interpreted and applied in accordance with
United States obligations under internationallaw," 110 or, "[n]othing
in this section shall be construed to restrict in a manner incon·
sistent with international law navigational rights and freedoms as
defined by United States law, treaty, convention, or customary in·
ternationallaw ."111 Although Congress only rarely enacts these pro·
visions, courts also rarely apply the Charming Betsy doctrine, with
one scholar estimating that the Court applied it in only a dozen
cases in the last hundred years. 112 The infrequency with which Con·
gress enacts this interpretive rule may simply reflect the rarity with
which domestic laws conflict with internationallaws. 113 It may also
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. at 118)).

108. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ

STATUTES AND THE CoNSTITUTION 355 (2016) r~ost academics consider the international law

canon an important principle for statutory as well as constitutional interpretation, but the
treatises and many judicial opinions take a passive-aggressive stance, either ignoring this
canon or seeking to give it a narrow ambit."); Roger P. Alford, Foreign Relations as a Matter
of Interpretation. The Use and Abuse of Charming Betsy, 67 Omo ST. L.J. 1339, 1340·41
(2006); Curtis A Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 685
(2000); Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104 YALE L.J. 39, 43
(1994); Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of Domestic Statutory

Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103, 1130-31 (1990).
109. Anthony J. Bollia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of Nations, 109

COLUM. L. REv. 1, 63-64 (2009) (arguing that Charming Betsy respects the principle that "the
Constitution allocates to the political branches, not courts, the powers to recognize foreign
nations and to risk bilateral conflict with such nations by interfering with their perfect
rights'1; Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation ofPowers: Rethinking

the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 4 79, 495-97, 526 (1998); see also Philip
R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665, 675

(1986) (reasoning that the application of the Charming Betsy canon "is the same as creating
a rule that the government regulatory scheme cannot violate international law'').

110. 16 u.s.c. § 7409(b).
111. 33 u.s.c. § 1902(i).
112. Alford, supra note 108, at 1353 ("[T]he Supreme Court has expressly relied upon the
Charming Betsy doctrine in approximately a dozen cases in the past one hundred years.").
113. Barrett, supra note 30, at 138 n.132 (arguing that the rarity with which Supreme
Court cases rely on the Charming Betsy canon "may be more a function of the frequency with

which federal courts interpret statutes arguably infringing upon international law than a
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be that Congress is not particularly aware of, or concerned with,
international law and drafts accordingly.
Relatedly, courts sometimes invoke the Charming Betsy canon to
avoid conflict with a treaty rather than with internationallaw. 114
These courts applied the canon to treaties in a variety of substantive
areas, including immigration, 116 diplomatic relations, 116 and employment discrimination. 117 Congress has enacted dozens of rules of
interpretation aimed at treaties."" For example, Congress created
rules as straightforward as: "Nothing in this chapter may be construed as contravening any treaty of the United States.""" That
Congress has enacted more provisions aimed at treaties than provisions aimed at international law generally is perhaps unsurprising given that treaties are voted on by Congress and so look more
like enacted statutes than international law, which exists apart
from any action by Congress. 120

measure of judicial devotion to the canon").
114. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984);
see also Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933); Chew Heong v. United States, 112
U.S. 536, 540 (1884). Courts also sometimes construe treaties to avoid the implied repeal of
earlier statutes. See, e.g., Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309, 321 (1907); United States v. Lee
Yen Tai, 185 U.S. 213, 222 (1902); Blanco v. United States, 775 F.2d 53, 61 (2d Cir. 1985); see
also Curtis A Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the
Interpretative Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 488-90 (1998) (discussing courts'
use of the Charming Betsy canon in a variety of settings).
115. See, e.g., Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 151 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (involving provisiDns
in human rights treaties relating to expulsion of aliens).
116. See, e.g., United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1464-65
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (involving United NatiDns Headquarters Agreement).
117. See, e.g., Spiessv. C. ltoh& Co. (Am.), Inc., 643 F.2d 353, 356 (5th Cir. 1981) (graoting
"American subsidiaries of Japanese corporations the limited right to discriminate in favor of
Japanese nationals in filling [managerial and technical] positions").
118. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2441(d)(1); 16 U.S. C. § 1274(a)(17); see also CoNG. RscH. SERV.,
RL32528,lNTERNATIONALLAWANDAGREEMENTS:THEIREFFECTUPONU.S.LAW20-23(2018)
[hereinafter CONG. RsCH. SERV., INTERNATIONAL LAW]. The Author's searches uncovered
seventy-six different instances where an interpretive rule was aimed at the interpretation of
a law in light of treaties.
119. 10
§ 7651(d).
120. See CONG. RSCH. SERV., INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 118, at 2-3. Customary
international law may still be binding in the United States, but not because of any
congressional enactment. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004) (rea:ffll'ming
the principle that "the domestic law of the United States recognizes the law of nations").

u.s.c.
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3. Indian Law Canons
Another set of substantive canons deals with the interpretation
of statutes that affect Native American tribes. 121 These canons have
a long pedigree going back to the early 1800s. 122 The first of these
canons began as a rule of treaty interpretation but expanded to
include statutory interpretation, and it continues to apply to both
sources of law .123 As developed over the last two hundred years, the
Indian canons today instruct courts to
construe treaties and agreements with tribes as the Indians
themselves would have understood them, including broadly
implied tribal rights, ... construe treaties, statutes, and other
sources of law liberally in favor of Indians, so as to resolve any
ambiguities or uncertainties in their favor, ... and ... construe
federal statutes not to abrogate or limit tribal sovereign rights
... unless Congress clearly intended such laws to limit such
rights. 124
This Article's findings reveal an increasing number of enacted
interpretive rules that accomplish the same purpose as the Indian
Canons. For example, Congress enacted an interpretive rule stating
that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed to affect the
121. PhilipP. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and
Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARv. L. REv. 381, 386 (1993).
122. See Worcesterv. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 541 (1832); Patterson v. Jenks, 27 U.S.
(2 Pet.) 216, 229 (1829). For a discussion of these cases, see Barrett, supra note 30, at 151.
123. See, e.g., Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 143 S. Ct. 2024, 2030-32 (2014); South
Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 686-87 (1993); County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes
& Bands ofYakimaindianNation, 502 U.S. 251,269 (1992) ("When we are faced with ... two

possible constructions, our choice between them must be dictated by a principle deeply rooted
in this Court's Indian jurisprudence: '[S]tatutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the
Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit.'" (quoting Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985))); United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738-39 (1986);
Washington v. Wash. State Com. Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 690 (1979);
Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412-13 (1968). See generally Barrett, supra
note 30, at 152 (describing the evolution of the canon from applying to treaties to applying to
statutes); Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty
Abrogation:·~ Long as Water Flows. or Grass Grows Upon the Earth"-How Long a Time
Is That?, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 601, 623-34 (1975) (describing various formulations of the Indian
treaty canon).
124. Bryan H. Wildenthal, Indian Sovereignty. General Federal Laws. and the Canons of
Construction: An Overview and Update, 6 AM. INDIAN L.J. 98, 102 (2017).
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obligation of the United States to any Indian or Indian tribe arising
out of any treaty, statute, Executive order, or the trust responsibility of the United States owing to such Indian or Indian tribe." 126

B. Continuity Canons
Another set of canons focuses on creating continuity within a
statutory scheme. These canons generally aim to interpret laws in
ways that make the broader body of law consistent, to the extent
possible. 126 This Section discusses some of the most important of
these canons and how Congress enacts similar rules in statutes. Of
enacted rules, continuity canons are by far the most commonly
used. 127
Table 4. Enacted Rules of Interpretation in the U.S. CodeContinuity Canons
Type of Rule of Interpretation
Consistent Usage
Presumption Against Implied Repeal
Common Law

1946
59
411
42

1970
145
366
74

1994
1,308
608
113

2017
3,605
1,178
97

1. Whole Act, Whole Code, and Presumption of
Consistent Usage
Courts frequently use presumptions that assume consistency
within, and even across, individual statutes. 128 One example is the
presumption of consistent usage, one of the most important continuity canons, which presumes that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning." 129
125. 21 u.s.c. § 862(1).
126. See Manning, supra note 48, at 1869.
127. Seeid.

128. CONG. RBCH. SERV., R45153, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: THEORIES, TOOLS, AND

TRENDS 23-25 (2018) [hereinafter CONG. RsCH. SERV., THEORIES].
129. Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990) (citing Sorenson v. Sec'y ofTreas., 475
U.S. 851, 860 (1986)); see also Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 232
(2007); Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 562 (1995) (describing this rule as a "normal
rule of statutory construction"); Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 253-54 (1994);
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This ru1e is a type of a more general interpretive principle, sometimes known as the whole act rule, according to which "each term or
provision [of a statute] should be viewed as part of a consistent and
integrated whole" body of federallaw. 180
Courts also apply this type of reasoning across statutes. For
example, the Court often invokes a canon known as the in pari
materia canon, which presumes that when two statutes use similar
language, the fact that Congress chose to use the similar language
should be read as a "strong indication that the two statutes should
be interpreted pari passu," meaning side by side. 181 Similarly, the
Court often applies the whole code rule to presume consistency
among enacted laws even if those laws were enacted at very
different times. 182 In other words, not only will courts construe the
same or similar words within one statute to have the same meaning,
Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 229-31 (1993). But see Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410,
417 & n.3 (1992). This presumption is commonly enacted into state laws guiding
interpretation. See Soott, supra note 6, at 368 tbl.3 (showing that thirty states have enacted

such a presumption).
130. MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 34, at 224; Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 28,
at 12-13; see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132-33 (2000)
(Justice O'Connor writing for the majority that ambiguity only becomes clear "when placed

in context"); Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute lndiao Tribe, 526 U.S. 865, 873-74 (1999) (Justice
Kennedy holding for the majority that the meaning of a disputed term could only be
understood in context of other relevant congressional acts); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 164,

164-66 (1997) (Justice Scalia writing for the majority, clarifying the disputed term by

"compar[ing it] with the language Congress ordinarily uses"); W.Va. Univ. Hasps. v. Casey,
499 U.S. 83, 99-101 (1991) (Justice Scalia for the majority relying on the use nf the terms
"attorney's fees" and "expert fees" in federal statutes throughout the U.S. Code); Lorillard,
Inc. v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978) (holding that the right to a jury trial permitted in the
Fair Labor Standards Act also applied to the Age Discrimination Act because the text,
structure, and history of the two statutes were in pari materia).
131. Northcross v. Bd. of Educ., 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973) (per curiam); see also United
States v. Freemao, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 556, 564-65 (1845) t1fa thing contained in a subsequent
statute, be within the reason of a former statute, it shall be taken to be within the meaning
of that statute; and if it can be gathered from a subsequent statute in pari materia, what
meaning the legislature attached to the words of a former statute, they will amount to a
legislative declaration of its meaning, and will govern the construction of the first statute."
(citation omitted)); Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 184-85 (1988) rwe
generally presume that Congress is knowledgeable about existing law pertinent to the
legislation it enacts."); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 252-255; WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR.,
JAMES J. BRUDNEY, JOSH CHAFETZ, PHILIP P. FRiCKEY & ELizABETH GARRETr, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF Pum.Jc POLICY

859-66 (6th ed. 2020).

132. See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 529 U.S. at 130, 133; Amoco, 526 U.S. at 875;
Bennett, 520 U.S. at 157, 173-74.
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but courts will also construe the same or similar words used in
different statutes to have the same meaning. These rules are not
without their critics, 133 but courts continue to apply them
regularly. 134
This Article's findings show that Congress chooses to explicitly
define specific terms in one statute in relation to other words in that
statute, or other statutes, with increasing frequency in recent
decades. In 1946, Congress rarely did so, but today this is by far the
most common type of enacted interpretive rule. 135 Increasingly,
when Congress intends for similar words to have the same meaning
across a statute or the Code, it explicitly says so in clear statutory
terms. For example, many statutes say something like: "The term
'publication' has the meaning given such term in section 101 of title
17,"136 "[t]he terms 'emergency' and 'unanticipated' have the
meanings given to such terms in section 900(c) of this title," 137 or
"the term 'Member' has the meaning given such term by section
2106, notwithstanding section 8331(2)." 138 While Congress most
often defines terms in relation to other federal statutes, Congress

133. See RICHARD PoSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 281 (1985) ('The
conditions under which legislators work is not conducive to careful, farsighted, and
parsimonious drafting."); Gluck & Bressman, supra note 2, at 936-37 (noting that less than
10 percent of their respondents indicated that drafters often or always intend to apply terms
consistently across unrelated statutes); Buzbee, supra note 53, at 171-72. But see SCALIA &
GARNER, supra note 1, at 51 ("When it is widely understood in the legal community that, for
example, a word used repeatedly in a document will be taken to have the same meaning
throughout ... you can expect those who prepare legal documents competently to draft
accordingly.").
134. See Powerex Corp., 551 U.S. at 232; GWita{son, 513 U.S. at 570; Sullivan, 496 U.S. at
484. But see Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 417 & n.3 (fmding the whole act rule unhelpful). Courts do

not apply rules of consistent usage without limit. Courts still look for indicia of legislative
intent indicating that the terms were intended to have different meanings. See, e.g., Gen.
Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 595-96 (2004); Atl. Cleaners & Dyers, Inc.
v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932).
135. See supra Table 4.
136. 2
§ 1741(4).
§ 622(11).
137. 2
138. 5
§ 8332(6)(B).

u.s.c.
u.s.c.
u.s.c.
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also frequently defines a word in a statute in relation to its use in
agency regulations, 139 treaties, 140 or state law. 141

2. Presumption Against Implied Repeal
Another frequently invoked continuity canon is the presumption
against implied repeal. The large body of enacted laws gives rise to
potential conflicts that courts must reconcile. 142 This canon presumes that Congress does not intend to repeal an earlier statute
with the enactment of a later statute unless it does so explicitly. 143
To quote a leading Supreme Court case on this canon, it is a "cardinal rule ... that repeals by implication are not favored." 144 Courts
often justify using this canon on similar grounds as other continuity
canons, explaining that the goal of interpretation is to give a
coherent meaning to the entire body oflaw of which any one law is
just a small part. 145 This canon creates a strong presumption, with
judges rarely willing to find that a later statute repealed an earlier
statute without clear evidence of a congressional intent to do so. 146
139. See, e.g., 50 U.S. C. § 1701(e)(1)(D) ("The term 'foreign financial institution' has the
meaning given that term in section 1010.605 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations.'1; 42
U.S. C. § 17921(12) ("The term 'protected health information' has the meaning given such term
in section 160.103 of title 45, Code of Federal Regulations.'?.
140. See, e.g., 19 U.S. C. § 3805(15) ("The term 'territory' has the meaning given that term
in Annex lA of the Agreement.").
141. 33 U.S.C. § 668 ("For the purposes of this chapter 'hydraulic mining' and 'mining by
the hydraulic process' are declared to have the meaning and application given to said terms
in the State of California.'?; 42 U.S.C. § 15092(2)(A) C'Subject to subparagraph (B), for
purposes of the application of this subchapter in a State, the term 'family' has the meaning
given the term by the State.'?142. ESKRIDGE, supra note 108, at 127.
143. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 29, at 868 (noting that the more recent law can specify
whether it is intending to overturn earlier law, but observing that ''[u]nfortunately, most of
the time the more recent statute says nothing on" the question of implied repeal); SCALIA &
GARNER, supra note 1, at 327; Karen Petroski, Retheorizing the Presumption. Against Implied
Repeals, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 487, 488-89 (2004).
144. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 549 (1974) (quoting Posadas v. Nat1 City Bank, 296
u.s. 497, 503 (1936)).
145. See W.Va. Univ. Hasps. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100-01 (1991) C'[I]t is our role to make
sense rather than nonsense out of the corpus juris.'').
146. See J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int1, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001)
('Tbe rarity with which [the Court has] discovered implied repeals is due to the relatively
stringent standard for such findings, namely, that there be an irreconcilable conflict between
the two federal statutes at issue." (quoting Matushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S.
367, 381 (1996))); ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 29, at 875 C'[I]t is almost unheard of for federal
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The Author's searches uncovered over one thousand examples in
the 2017 U.S. Code explicitly stating that courts should not construe
an enacted statute to repeal other laws. 147 These enacted provisions
often target ensuring that a later law is not construed to repeal a
specific earlier law.' 48 For example, one statute says, "[n]othing in
this section shall be construed to repeal or modify any provision of
the Public Health Service Act or Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act." 149 Sometimes, however, the later law more broadly states that
it should not be construed to repeal any earlier law that is not explicitly addressed in the statute. 15°For example, one provision says
that the statute "shall not be construed as limiting or repealing any
existing law or authority of the Secretary except as specifically cited
in this subchapter."'"' Although these provisions appear more frequently in recent versions of the Code, Congress has long used
similar enacted provisions.

3. Common Law Canons
A longstanding canon of interpretation presumes that Congress
does not intend to change common law without explicitly doing so,
or in other words, "statutes in derogation of the common law are to
be strictly construed."152 Judges and scholars have criticized this
canon, calling it a "relic," a "fossil," and "a sheer judicial power
grab." 153 Twenty state legislatures have rejected this canon, with
judges to declare that a recent federal law has implicitly repealed a previous one.").
147. See supra Table 4. States often enact a similar presumption as a generally applicable
rule. See Scott, supra note 6, at 397 tbl.lO (showing that fifteen states have enacted a rule
against implied repeals).
148. CONG. RsCH. SERV., R97-589, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND

RECENT TRENDS 20-21 (2014) [hereinafter CONG. RSCH. SERV., GENERAL PRINCIPLES].
149. 18 U.S.C. § 42(a)(1).
150. See CONG. RSCH. SERV., GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 148, at 31-33 (2014).
151. 16 U.S.C. § 1645(e).
152. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 318; see also Robert C. Herd & Co. v. Krawill
Mach. Corp., 359 U.S. 297, 304-05 (1959); Shaw v. R.R. Co., 101 U.S. 557, 565 (1879) ("No
statute is to be construed, as altering the common law, farther than its words import.");
Nowak v. City of Country Club Hills, 958 N.E.2d 1021, 1026 (Ill. 2011); Evans v. Evaos, 695
S.E.2d 173, 176 ('Ia. 2010).
153. Harlan Fiske Stone, The Common L= in the United States, 50 IIARv. L. REv. 4, 18
(1936) (calling this canon ao "ancient shibboleth"); Wenfang Liu v. Muod, 686 F. 3d 418, 421
(7th Cir. 2012) (calling this canon a "fossil remnant of the traditional hostility of English
judges to legislation"); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 318 (calling this canon "a relic of
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none of them endorsing it. 164 The canon has eroded in recent decades
as statutory law has grown to overtake the common law .155 Although
the canon is now less relevant, courts still apply the canon with
some frequency when there is a potential for conflict between common law and a statute. 156 When applied, the canon looks similar to
the presumption against implied repeal, discussed in the previous
Subsection, in that "[flor both, the alteration of prior [common or
statutory]law must be clear-but it need not be express, nor should
its clear implication be distorted." 167
The Author's searches uncovered nearly one hundred examples
in the 2017 Code of enacted interpretive rules aimed at interpreting
the statute not to derogate from the common law. 168 For example,
one statute says, "[t]he remedies provided under this subsection ...
shall not be construed as limiting such other remedies, including
any remedy available to an individual at common law." 169 Another
states, "[n]othing in this subsection shall be construed to restrict the
applicability of common law protections and rights that a member
of the Board of Governors or officer of the Civil Air Patrol may
have." 160 However, unsurprisingly, enacted interpretive rules relating to the common law are the only rules that appear less often in
the courts' historical hostility to the emergence of statutory lawj; Antonin Scalia, CommonLaw Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting
the Constitution and Laws, in AMATTEROF INTERPRETATION, supra note 46, at 29 (calling this
canon a "sheer judicial power grab"); Gluck, Federal Common Law, supra note 1, at 769
("[P]erhaps this canon is simply the most obvious manifestation of the way in which courts
use interpretive methodology to retain some law-making power for themselves in a changing
legal world."). The origins of this canon are contested. Compare Roscoe Pound, Common Law
and Legislation, 21liARv. L. REV. 383, 402 (1908) (claiming that this canon did not originate
in English courts but was instead "an American product of the nineteenth century"), with
CARLETON KEMP ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 456-57 n.6 (7th ed. 1964) (showing that this
canon "was at least as old as the time of Edward m [1327 -1377]" and that the canon is "older
than Professor Pound allows'~.
154. Scott, supra note 6, at 402 tbl.ll.
156. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 29, at 761-62.
156. See CONG. RBCH. SERV., GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 148, at 20-21 (2014).
157. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 318; see also Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S.
779, 783 (1952) ("Statutes which invade the common law ... are to be read with a presumption
favoring the retention of long-established and familiar principles, except when a statutory
purpose to the contrary is evident.j.
168. The Author uncovered ninety-seven different instances across twenty-three different
titles of the Code. See supra Table 4.
159. 42 u.s.c. § 1395i-3(b)(5).
160. 10 u.s.c. § 9497(g)(3).
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the 2017 Code than in the 1994 Code, which means more laws with
these types of provisions were removed from the Code than were
added. This is likely the case for the same reason that the common
law canon is less commonly used in recent years: statutes are now
the primary source oflaw and, accordingly, congressional drafters
need not account for the common law as much as they used to.

C. Other Interpretive Rules
The Author's searches uncovered several other regularly enacted
interpretive rules that relate to common interpretive rules but do
not fall neatly into the categories covered in the previous two Sections.
Table 5. Enacted Rules of Interpretation-Others
Type of Rule of Interpretation
Severability
Private Right of Action
Sovereign Immunity

1946
251
0
0

1970
303
0
5

1994
283
17
36

2017
395
68
59

1. Severability
Another judicial canon, known as severability, attempts to salvage the remainder of a statute when a portion of the statute is
found unconstitutional. 161 The idea underlying this canon is that
Congress would prefer to leave as much of its laws intact as possible if a portion of the law is determined to be unconstitutional
by a court. 162 The question that courts must confront in a severability analysis is whether the law can stand without the unconstitutional provision and how much of the law remains.' 63 Scholars have

161. See, e.g., Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 789-90 (E.D. Va.
2010) (holding that the ''individual mandate" portion of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, colloquially known as Obamacare, is unconstitutional and must be severed from the

rest of the Act).
162. See id. at 789.
163. Seeid.
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debated how courts should conduct these kinds of severability
analyses and whether they should even do so at all. 164
As this Article's findings show, Congress has long included severability provisions in statutes by explicitly stating that the rest of
a law should stand if a portion is found unconstitutional. 165 Enacted
severability clauses are among the most commonly enacted interpretive rules of the last seventy-five years; the most recent version
of the Code includes hundreds of these provisions throughout_ 166
These provisions contain language like: ''If any provision of this
chapter, or the application thereof to any person or circumstance, is
held invalid, the remainder of the chapter, and the application of
164. See, e.g., David H. Gans, Severability as Judicial Lawmaking, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
639, 643-45 (2008) (arguing that severability should be limited not by an inquiry into
legislative intent, but an analysis of whether the court would be engaged too much in
lawmaking); Mark L. Movsesian, Severability in Statutes and Contracts, 30 GA. L. REV. 41,
45·46 (1995) (arguing that severability should be decided purely on textualism, that a
severability or inseverability clause should be followed literally, and that there should be a

presumption of severability otherwise); Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REv. 235, 293 (1994) (arguing that a default presumption ofinsev-

erability is preferable). For an example of authors arguing for expansions of the doctrine, see
Michael D. Shumsky, Severability, lnseverability, and the Rule of Law, 4 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
227, 271-72 (2004) (advocating a clear statement rule indicating severability and arguing that
"[s]tatutes are severable unless the legislature clearly states otherwise"); John Copeland
Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. REV. 203, 206 (1993) (arguing that in the absence of a clear
statement ofinseverability in the statute, severability should be assumed); Glenn Chatmas
Smith, From Unnecessary Surgery to Plastic Surgery: A New Approach to the Legislative Veto
Severability Cases, 24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 397, 461-63 (1987) (arguing that courts should not
stop with simply severing unconstitutional sections of a bill, but should reconstruct a law in
order to vindicate legislative will, even when this means adding new language).
166. See supra Table 6. More rarely, Congress enacts rules ofinseverability whereby if one
portion of the statute is held unconstitutional, the rest of the statute, or another part thereof,
is invalid. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-1(a) C'In GeneraL-Except as provided in subsection (b),
if any provision [of] part A orB of subtitle 2 of title XXI of the Public Health Service Act [42
U.S.C. 300aa-10 et seq., 300aa-21 et seq.], as added by section 311(a), or the application of
such a provision to any person or circumstance is held invalid by reason of a violation of the
Constitution, both such parts shall be considered invalid.'); 25 U.S.C. § 2201 (explicitly
stating that invalidity of any provision of Pub. L. 108-374 does not affect the validity of
remaining provisions, "except that each of subclauses (II), (III), and (IV) of section
205(c)(2)(1)(i) of the [Act] is deemed to be inseverable from the other 2, such that if any 1 of
those 3 subclauses is held to be invalid for any reason, neither of the other 2 of such
subclauses shall be given effect''). It is also worth noting that the Author did not find evidence
of enacted canons requiring courts to read statutes to avoid constitutional issues, which is a
popular judicial canon. Barrett, supra note 30, at 138-43 (describing the evolution and use of
the constitutional avoidance canon). Instead, Congress only focused on how much of a law
should remain if a court found a provision unconstitutional.
166. See supra Table 5.
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such provision to other persons or circumstances, shall not be affected thereby ."167 The fact that these provisions are so ubiquitous,
and are almost always directed at giving the rest of the law effect if
a court finds a portion of the law to be unconstitutional, shows that
Congress is aware of the possibility of unconstitutionality and that
its general preference is that as much of their laws survive as possible.168
These enacted severability provisions are unique from many other rules of interpretation in that they often use the same language
and structure no matter where they appear in the Code. 169 They also
have not changed much over the last seventy-five years. 170 They
may, therefore, function more as boilerplate and less as well-drafted
and thought through descriptions of congressional intent, 171 although there is a good argument that this may not matter in the
statutory context. 172 Courts appear skeptical of these kinds of enacted provisions and seem to apply a similar severability standard
and analysis whether or not a statute contains an enacted severability clause. 173 To quote one such court, "[t]he act in question contains a 'saving clause,' which it seems customary nowadays to insert
in all legislation with the apparent hope that it may work some not
167. 46 U.S.C. § 161. States regularly enact similarly generally applicable severability
rules that require courts to ''pemit[] as much of a questionable act to survive as possible.'•
Scott, supra note 6, at 385-86 ("Legislatures are wildly enthusiastic about severability: it is
codified in thirty-five jurisdictions; none have rejected it."). Alabama's formulation is common:
"H any provision of this Code or any amendment hereto ... is held invalid by a court of
competent jurisdiction, such invalidity shall not affect the provisions or application of this
Code ... , and to this end, the provisions of this Code ... are declared to be severable." ALA.
CODE§ 1-1-16 (2021).
168. See, e.g., CONG. RBCH. SERV., GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 148, at 42.
169. Jarrod Shobe, Severability (unpublished research results) (on file with author).
170. Seeid.
171. See WILLIAM D. POPKIN, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: POLITICAL LANGUAGE AND THE
POLITICAL PROCESS 433 (1st ed. 1993); LAURENCE H. TRiBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 79-80
(1986); Max Radin, A Short Way With Statutes, 661IARv. L. REV. 388, 419 (1942); Robert L.
Stern, Separability and Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court, 51 HARV. L. REV. 76, 12223 (1937); Note, Severability ofLegislative Veto Provisions: A Policy Analysis, 97 HARV. L. REV.
1182, 1185-86 (1984).
172. See, e.g., Movsesian, supra note 164, at 75-77 (persuasively making the case that the
argument that statutory language is boilerplate and should therefore be ignored is weak in
the statutory context and much weaker than in the contract context, in which boilerplate
arguments are much more common).
173. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 932-35 (1983); Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 290
(1924).
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quite understood magic." 174 These severability clauses have received
considerable scholarly attention, likely because of how much attention courts have afforded them. 175

2. Private Right of Action Canon
Another canon creates a presumption against a private right of
action for violating a statute absent an express or clearly implied
intention to do so. 176 Although historically courts expressed willingness to find that a statute created a private right of action, 177 in
recent decades the Court has implied a strong presumption against
such a right, with one Supreme Court decision stating, "it is not for
us to fill any hiatus Congress has left in this area." 178 While courts
do not require a statute to explicitly create a private right of action,
congressional intention to create such a right must be clear from the
statute. 179
The Author's searches uncovered dozens of enacted statutes in the
2017 Code containing similar provisions, 180 including language like:
"Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to create a private
right of action." 181 Interestingly, the Author did not find any
instances of a similar interpretive rule in the 1946 or 1970 versions
of the Code. 182 Perhaps Congress was responding to courts' earlier
willingness to read a private right of action into statutes by explicitly disallowing such a right.

174. Kapaun v. Fed. Land Bank of Omaha, 269 N.W. 564, 565 (N.D.1936).
175. Brian Charles Lea, Situational Severability, 103 VA. L. REV. 735, 737 (2017); Gans,
supra note 164, at 649 n.51; Movsesian, supra note 164, at 42; Nagle, supra note 164, at 20405; Stern. supra note 171, at 77.
176. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 313.
177. Id. (citing to cases from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries creating a private
right of action based on the common law rule that "where there iB a right, there is a remedy'').
178. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 579 (1979) (emphasis added) (quoting
Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963)).
179. SCALIA& GARNER, supra note 1, at 315-17.
180. See supra Table 5.
181. Law of Aug. 22, 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 9858c(4)(B) (repealed Oct. 1, 1996).
182. See supra Table 5.
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3. Sovereign Immunity
Another canon presumes that a statute does not waive federal
or state sovereign immunity unless the statute is unequivocally
clear. 183 To quote a Supreme Court case from 1899: ''The Government is not liable to suit unless it consents thereto, and its liability
in suit cannot be extended beyond the plain language of the statute
authorizing it." 184 This canon dates back to British courts before
the founding of the United States. 185 The canon has not gone unchallenged, 186 and it does appear that the canon has lost some of its
strength in recent decades, 187 but it continues to be applied by
federal courts with some regularity.
As with other canons discussed in this Part, Congress sometimes
includes provisions relating to sovereign immunity in enacted statutes, with fifty-nine such provisions appearing in the 2017 Code. 188
Most commonly, these provisions specify that the statute does not
waive sovereign immunity with language as straightforward as,
"[t]his section does not constitute a waiver of the sovereign immunity of the United States,''189 while other times a statute might say
that it should be given full effect "notwithstanding ... any law of or
relating to sovereign immunity."190 However, Congress began enacting these types of provisions relatively recently; the Author's
searches did not uncover any such provisions in the 1946 Code and
only five in the 1970 Code. 191

183. See Franconia Assocs. v. United States, 536 U.S. 129, 141 (2002) (stating that "a
waiver of sovereign immunity ... 'cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.'"
(quoting United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969))); United States v. Nordic Viii., Inc., 503
U.S. 30, 39 (1992) (holding that a statute did not waive sovereign immunity because it lacked
unequivocal expression to that effect).
184. Price v. United States, 174 U.S. 373, 375-76 (1899).
185. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 281.
186. Id. at 283 C'Some state supreme courts have judicially abolished the doctrine of
sovereign immunity in the area of tort liability, and the Supreme Court of the United States
has spoken ill of the doctrine in general." (footnote omitted)).
187. Id. at 284 (noting that "the rigor with which courts have applied the interpretive rule
disfavoring waivers of sovereign immunity has abated").
188. See supra Table 5.
189. 25 u.s.c. § 3712(d).
190. 12 u.s.c. § 1455(d).
191. See supra Table 5.
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Ill. INTERPRETING STATUTES IN LIGHT OF ENACTED RULES OF
INTERPRETATION

This Part considers the implications of the findings described in
Part II for statutory interpretation. First, it discusses how Congress's practice of regularly enacting rules of interpretation for
individual statutes makes it less likely that Congress will create a
generally applicable set of such rules. It then discusses the process
of codification for rules of interpretation and how this process could
affect courts' usage of such rules. It then examines the potential
impact of enacted rules of interpretation for how courts approach
using unenacted canons. It also considers how changes in Congress's
use of enacted rules of interpretation over time should influence
how judges approach interpretation today.
Because this is the first article to approach this issue, it does not
attempt to resolve the issue conclusively; instead, it explores
potential arguments for and against the use of judicial canons in
light of Congress's enacted rules of interpretation. These arguments
are relevant for all dominant theories of interpretation because all
such theories rely on judicial canons in their interpretive practices.
A. The Unlikely Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation

This Article's findings show that, despite calls for Congress to
create a general set of rules of statutory interpretation that would
apply equally to all statutes, 192 Congress is unlikely to adopt that
approach. The findings also show that the need for generally applicable rules is perhaps less pressing than commonly believed
because Congress already regularly creates interpretive rules for
individual statutes, and has increasingly done so in recent decades.
Congress creates enacted rules on a statute-by-statute basis
according to its preferences for each statute. 193 Creating a generally
applicable set of rules would upset the already existing rules of
interpretation throughout the Code and would create inevitable
192. See Quintin Johnstone, An Evaluation of the Rules of Interpretation, 4 KAN. L. REv.
1, 6-7 (1954); Tushnet, supra DDte 78, at 1077 n.21.
193. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 6, at 343.
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conflicts between the general rules and the more specifically enacted
rules.
Congress likely prefers a statute-by-statute approach to enacting
interpretive rules because it allows drafters to tailor provisions
according to their preferences in each situation. Some commentators
argue that frequent conflicts between a generally applicable set of
federal rules of interpretation and the legislature's intent in a
specific enactment would complicate the courts' application of such
rules. 194 However, if Congress enacts these rules on a statute-bystatute basis, this concern is significantly diminished because Congress can specify the interpretive rules it wants to apply to an
individual statute and consider those rules as part of the legislative negotiations surrounding that particular statute.
The Author did not find much evidence of the enactment of many
commonly used textual or linguistic canons, especially those aimed
at uncovering Congress's likely intended linguistic usage. That is
perhaps unsurprising considering the nature of these canons.
Because these canons mean to reflect common usage, 196 it would
make sense that congressional drafters would not even think to
say that these types of canons apply.
Linguistic rules seem to be the type of rules best suited for Congress to enact on a Code-wide basis. Yet, Congress apparently either
cannot reach a consensus on or has not bothered to consider how to
instruct courts on which linguistic tools to use to uncover meaning.
These types oflinguistic rules, like expressio unius, noscitur a sociis,
and ejusdem generis, also almost never appear in enacted state rules
of interpretation, even though states often enact long and detailed
rules of interpretation that are generally applicable to states
codes. 196 It is therefore unsurprising that Congress similarly chooses
not to enact these types of linguistic rules on the federal level.

194. Cf. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 245 (fmding "[a]n interpretive command
applicable to all statutes ... problematic-more likely to be an intrusion upon the courts'
function of interpreting the laws, rather than an exercise of the legislature's power to clarify

the meaning of its product").
195. See, e.g., Barrett. supra note 30, at 117.
196. Scott, supra note 6, at 357 tbl.l (showing that no states codified expressio unius (and
in fact three reject it), and only two states codified each of nosictur a sociis and ejusdem
generis).
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One exception to the legislature's refusal to enact linguistic rules
is the generally applicable Dictionary Act, which appears in the first
section of the first title of the Code and applies to "any Act of Congress."197 But this Act only provides straightforward guidance like
the plural includes the singular, the singular includes the plural,
and the present tense includes the future. However, even that
guidance is advisory and can be overcome by context. 198 The rules
provided in the Dictionary Act are rarely important to interpretation, and the Act does not address the common textual canons that
courts often apply. 199 Maybe the most we could expect from Congress
in the form of a generally applicable set of interpretive rules is an
expanded Dictionary Act with a set of textual canons that could
apply across the entire Code, while other canons would be left for
Congress to decide on a statute-by-statute basis.

B. Issues of Codification
One key difference between enacted rules of interpretation and
other types of statutory language is the way they are codified. After
Congress enacts a bill into law, a nonpartisan group within Congress known as the Office of Law Revision Counsel (OLRC) takes
that enacted law and organizes it within the U.S. Code by either
amending the existing Code or inserting the new law in the proper
places in the Code. 200 The OLRC's role in determining how enacted
197. 1 u.s.c. § 1.

198. ld. The Dictionary Act says that its rules apply unless "context indicates otherwise."
States often enact a similar presumption into their rules of interpretation. See Scott, supra
note 6, at 371 tbl.4 (showing that states often enact interpretive rules relating to gender neu-

trality, rules that the singular includes plural, and rules that tenses are generally interchangeable).
199. See Emily J. Barnet, Hobby Lobby and the Dictionarykt, 124 YALE L.J.F. 11, 14-16
(2014) (discussing the underuse of the Dictionary Act in statutory interpretation).
200. See About Classification of Laws to the United States Code, OFF. OF L. REVISION
COUNS. [hereinafter About Classification of Laws], https://uscode.house.gov/about_classi:fica
tion.xhtml [https://perma.cc/6MC3-ZBXU]. Some of the Statutes at Large do not make it into
the Code at all because they are not considered "general and permanent" in nature. Id.
Whether something qualifies as general and permanent can be a difficult judgment to make,
and the OLRC relies on its own precedents as to whether something qualifies. The descriptions of the codifiCation process here are based on the Author's research with respect to other
types of enacted provisions. See Shobe, supra note 11, at 691-94; Shobe, supra note 86, at 64249.

2040

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:1997

law is presented happens mostly behind the scenes and can lead to
certain enacted language being featured more prominently in the
Code than other enacted language.'01
The rules of interpretation described here often do not make it
into the main text of the Code, even though they are enacted law .'02
Instead, the OLRC often strips rules of interpretation from the
original bill and places the rules in notes at the end of sections of
the Code,"03 which can make these rules of interpretation difficult
to connect to the rest of the enacted bill.'04 Sometimes, these rules
are even difficult to identify as part of the enacted bill because the
notes appear in small font at the back of each provision alongside
text including both enacted and unenacted editor's notes.'05 Around
30 percent of the rules of interpretation found in the Author's
searches of the 2017 Code appear in these notes."06 Table 6, below,
illustrates the number of rules found in the main text of the Code
and in the notes of the Code for each of the types of rules discussed
in Part II.

201. See Shobe, supra note 86, at 642-43.

202. See id. at 643.
203. Detailed Guide to the United States Cade Content and Features, OFF. OF L. REVISION
CoUNs., https:/luscode.house.govldetaile<Lguide.xhtml [https1/perma.cc/5SBT-CCRL] ("There

are several categories of statutory notes. The most common are Change of Name, Effective
Date, Short Title, Regulations, Construction, and miscellaneous notes. Miscellaneous notes
include things like congressional findings, study and reporting requirements, and other
provisions related to the subject matter of the Code section under which they appear.").

204. See Shobe, supra note 86, at 656-58.
205. ld. at 661-62. Frequently &ked Questions and Giossary, OFF. OF L. REVISION COUNS.,

https://uscode.house.gov/faq.xhtml [https://perma.cc/364K-4AMR] ("Placement of a provision
as a statutory note under a section of either a positive law title or a non-positive law title has
no effect on the validity or legal force of the provision; that is, a provision set out as a
statutory note has the same validity and legal force as a provision classified as a section of the
Code."). For examples of the Supreme Court acknowledging this placement process, see U.S.
Nat'! Bank of Or. v. lndep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 448 (1993); United States

v. Welden, 377 U.S. 95, 98 n.4 (1964); Stephan v. United States, 319 U.S. 423, 426 (1943).
206. See id. at 656-58. Of the total of 11,415 rules of construction uncovered in the Author's
searches of the 2017 Code, 3,389 were in the notes to the Code (29. 7 percent). The Author was
able to tell which provisions came from the notes in the 2017 Code because of the way the text
is tagged in the HTML version of the 2017 Code. Only PDF versions are available for the 1946

and 1970 versions of the Code, and those do not contain the same type of tagging as more
recent years of the Code. The Author is therefore unable to give data on the number of
provisions found in the notes of the Code for those years, and so decided to only present data
on the most recent version of the Code, 2017.
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Table 6. Number of Enacted Rules of Interpretation2017 U.S. Code
Type of Rule oflnterpretation
Federalism
International Law
Indian Law
Consistent Usage
Presumption Against Implied Repeal
Common Law

Severability
Private Right of Action
Sovereign Immunity
Total

Main Text
792
66
87
2,581
640
89
150
53

Notes
95
17
159
1,024
538
8
245
15

51
4,509

8
2,109

Another complication of the codification process that can make it
difficult for interpreters to understand the role of rules of interpretation is that OLRC often takes a single enacted bill and splits it up
among various places in the Code. 207 As the OLRC states, "a single
freestanding provision that is general and permanent can relate
simultaneously to a number of different chapters and titles in the
Code."208 Because of this, it is left to OLRC's "editorial judgment" to
decide where each part ends up among the various options. 209 At the
same time, OLRC can decide to insert an entire bill, as it was
enacted by Congress, into a new chapter of the Code if that law is
"tied together with definitions, mutual cross references, or a common effective date and comprise the entire law or a distinct title of
the law." 210 In that case, the rules of interpretation will appear in
the same order and place as they appeared in Congress's original
enactment.""
The process by which OLRC exercises its editorial judgment is
often opaque to outsiders. 212 It may be that this process sometimes
207. See id. at 660-62.
208. See About Classification of Laws, supra nnte 200.
209. Seeid.
210. ld.
211. See Shobe, supra note 86, at 668-73.

212. Shobe, supra note 11, at 692.
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causes courts and litigants to overlook rules of interpretation.
Either because OLRC relegated the rules to notes or because the
OLRC separated the rules from other parts of the original law, it
can therefore be impossible for courts and litigants to match up the
rules to the original congressional enactment without resorting to
the Statutes at Large, which is difficult and time consuming. 213

C. Interpreting Statutes Containing Enacted Rules of
Interpretation
The fact that enacted rules of interpretation exist raises the
question of how courts should account for them in interpretation.
Although an in-depth empirical analysis of how courts use these
enacted rules is outside the scope of this Article, it does appear that
courts generally apply these provisions when enacted214-although
there is some question of whether courts treat these provisions as
coequal with other parts of a statute. There is some evidence that
courts treat these types of interpretive provisions as less authoritative than other, more operative statutory text. 215 The Author has
made similar observations about how courts tend to discount the
language of enacted findings and purposes sections as "precatory"

213. See, e.g., Shobe, supra note 86, at 660-68. These arguments are less relevant when
Congress has enacted the Code as j'positive law." This is a process by which the OLRC revises
the Code so that "the organizational structure of the law is improved, obsolete provisions are

eliminated, ambiguous provisions are clarified, inconsistent provisions are resolved, and
technical errors are corrected." Positive Law Codification, OFF. OFL.REVISIONCoUNs., https:/1

uscode.house.gov/codiflcationllegislati.on.shtml [https://perma.cc/6WGE-NDN3]. OLRC then
submits this to Congress as a restatement of existing law, which Congress then votes to enact
as "positive law/' meaning that after Congress's vote to approve it, the Code is the binding

law, not the Statutes at Large. Id. Currently half of the titles in the Code are positive law.
See. e.g., Shobe, supra note 86, at 674.
214. Gluck, Federal Common. Law, supra note 1, at 802 ("Federal courts routinely adhere
to these kinds of rules of construction in statutory cases."). For example, some courts have
relied on savings clauses. See Chamber of Com. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 580, 588 (2011); AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepci6n, 563 U.S. 332, 343-46 (2011); Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am.,
562 U.S. 323, 328-30 (2011). Others have relied on severability clauses. See Nat'l Fed'n of

lndep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 586 (2012) ("[The Medicaid statute] includes a

severability clause confirming that we need go no further."); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock,
480 U.S. 678, 686 (1987). For examples of reliance on preemption clauses, see Nat'l Meat

Ass'n v. Harris, 565 U.S. 452, 459-60 (2012); Whiting, 563 U.S. at 594.
215. See generally Shobe, supra note 11, at 694-98.
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or otherwise less valuable than other text. 216 Enacted rules of interpretation are similar in many ways to enacted findings and purposes and may receive similar treatment from courts. Although
courts consider enacted rules, courts may treat this text as less important than other parts of the law that look more operative. 217 For
example, courts often treat severability clauses as mere legislative
advisements rather than fully operative and binding statutory
text.''"
However courts use these rules today, this Article argues courts
should more explicitly treat enacted laws like law, distinguishing
them from unenacted judicial canons. By including a rule of interpretation in a statute, Congress means to convey that the rule survived the "competitive process of coalition building, bargaining, and
voting'' necessary for law to be created and should, therefore, be
treated as an integral part of the enacted text.' 19 Because enacted
rules of interpretation are law, they are as much a part of the
enacted text as any other part of a statute, and courts should give
them the full weight of law. 220 As the Court held, "[w]e do not ...
construe statutory phrases in isolation; we read statutes as a
whole."221 One part of a statute cannot be divorced from the rest of
the statute without distorting Congress's work because the entire
statute is the result of the legislative deal that led to enactment.
Courts must understand the rest of the enacted statute in light of
the enacted rules of interpretation and understand the enacted
rules of interpretation in light of the rest of the statute; otherwise,
216. ld. at 678 n.28.

217. Seeid.at694-98.
218. See Movsesian, supra note 164, at 74 ("Under present doctrine, ... 'the ultimate
determination of severability will rarely turn on the presence or absence' of such a clause."

(quoting United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 585 n.27 (1968))); Nagle, supra note 164, at
234-46 (showing that severability clauses are "usually treated as merely establishing a
presumption of severability" and that sometimes "a severability clause does not even fare that

well"). See generally Shumsky, supra note 164, at 245-66.
219. PhilipP. Frickey & StevenS. Smith, Judicial Review, The Congressional Process, and
the Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE L.J. 1707, 1745 (2002).
220. See, e.g., Montclairv. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883) (stating that the goal of the
whole act rule is to "give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute").

221. Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 319 (2010) (citing United States v. Morton, 467

U.S. 822, 828 (1984)); see also Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 28, at 12-13 (stating that the
whole act canon suggests that "each term or provision should be viewed as part of a consistent
and integrated whole").
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courts fail to give effect to the entire text that passed through the
constitutionally authorized process. 222 Because these rules have
been voted on by both houses of Congress and signed by the Pres·
ident, they should receive more weight in interpretation than other,
unenacted interpretive tools like legislative history and judge·made
canons. 223 For example, if Congress includes a provision stating that
nothing in a particular law should be construed to preempt state
law, that is the end of the matter as far as the encroachment on
state law is concerned. Courts need not look to legislative history or
other unenacted canons to make doubly sure that Congress meant
what it said. 224

D. Judicial Use of Canons in Light of Enacted Rules of
Interpretation
The previous Section discussed courts' use of enacted rules of
interpretation to interpret statutes. This Section examines a bigger
and more interesting question: If Congress increasingly enacts rules
of interpretation akin to canons, why do courts not acknowledge
Congress's ability to enact these rules of interpretation into law
when it chooses? This Section explores that question and what it
should mean for the use of judicial canons. It shows that all judges,
whether textualist or purposivist, should account for enacted rules

222. The Author has made similar arguments about judicial use of Findings and Purposes
clauses. See Shobe, supra note 11, at 712.
223. See id. at 673-75.
224. The interpretive rule can allow for a kind of imaginative reconstruction of what
Congress may have wanted when attempting to interpret an ambiguous statute. Posner,
supra note 23, at 817 (arguing that 4'the task for the judge called upon to interpret a statute
is ... one of imaginative reconstruction," which involves thinking his or her way ''into the

minds of the enacting legislators and im.agin[ing] how they would have wanted the statute ap-

plied to the case at bar''). Scholars have long noted that "the overwhelming probability" in any

diffiCult case is ''that the legislature gave no particular thought to the matter and had no in-

tent concerning it" and that attempting to reconstruct what Congress would have done had
it considered the issue is impossible. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1182 (1994);

id. at 1183

(''[O]n what basis does a court decide what a legislature ... would have done had it foreseen
the problem? Does the court consider the political structure of the ... legislature? Does the
court weigh the strength of various pressure groups operating at the time? How else can the
court form a judgment as to what the legislature would have done?'').
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of interpretation in their theories of interpretation given the central
role of judicial canons to all existing modes of interpretation.
One of this Article's most interesting findings is that the use of
enacted rules of interpretation has evolved over time, and that
many types of enacted rules are much more common today than
before. 226 Given how the drafting process has evolved, a static mode
of interpretation for all statutes may fail to account for the variable
circumstances under which statutes are created."26 Perhaps courts
should be more circumspect in applying certain canons to a recently
drafted statute than to an older statute given Congress's demonstrated ability to account for certain canons in recently enacted
statutes. This is consistent with the Author's previous findings
about improvements in the drafting process more generally. 227
Congress's increased use of rules of interpretation akin to canons
may be a manifestation of improving the substance of statutes. In
other words, it could be that Congress has gotten better at expressing its preferences. Relatedly, it seems possible that Congress
learned from judicial use of canons, which has become increasingly
prominent in recent decades, and so chooses to apply canon-like
rules when that is their preference."28 Perhaps judges should respond to the evolving quality of the drafting process accordingly by
giving less weight to unenacted canons and more weight to enacted
ones.
For example, this Article's findings show that Congress is
increasingly more explicit in defining terms in one statute by
reference to other parts of that statute or other statutes."29 The
commonly used and discussed "whole act rule" and "whole code
rule," discussed above, 230 which assume consistency inside a statute
and across statutes, make less sense when applied to modern
statutes given Congress's recent demonstrated ability to say when
it intends this kind of consistency. 231
225. See supra Part II.
226. See Manning, supra note 46, at 113-14.
227. See Jarrod Shobe, lntertemporal Statutory Interpretation and the Evolution of

Legislative Drafting, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 807, 849-51 (2014).
228. See CONG. Rscs. SERV., THEORIES, supra nnte 128, at 49-52.
229. See supra Table 4.
230. See supra Part II.B.l.
231. This Article's findings could also create viable arguments in favor of the use ofjudicial
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When Congress does not include a canon in a statute that it
regularly enacts in other statutes, it is most logical to assume that
Congress neglected to consider including the canon when drafting
the statute.' 82 For example, if Congress writes a statute without
explicit language that avoids preempting state law, that does not
necessarily reflect a congressional intent to preempt all state law.
But a congressional intent to explicitly avoid preempting a particular state law is similarly unlikely. Congress likely gave no thought
to the issue!"" Similarly, by not explicitly expressing intent to repeal earlier laws, Congress does not necessarily intend to repeal other laws. It is more likely Congress simply did not think about the
law's effect on other laws. 234 It seems that, in these situations, it is
hard to justify applying a presumption in favor of state laws by
using a federalism canon or a presumption against implied repeal
of earlier statutes under the theory that those canons match Congress's likely preferences.
There is significant debate on the legal status of statutory interpretation methods generally, and canons specifically, with some
scholars arguing that methodology, and therefore canons, should be
treated as law.' 35 Indeed, textualists' use of canons implies that
canons. Some scholars claim that many canons do not reflect congressional intent because
"nowhere in the United States Code is there any congressional endorsement of these canons."
Ross, supra note 57, at 563-64. AB Professor Eskridge argues, "the substantive canons are
hard if not impossible to defend on ordinary-use-of-language or this-is-what-the-legislaturewould-want grounds." Eskridge, supra note 34, at 682. This Article's findings show that the
U.S. Code does contain what could be viewed as congressional endorsement of certain canons,
and therefore, those canons may reflect how Congress thinks about how courts should interpret its statutes more generally.
232. See CONG. RsCH. SERV., THEORIES, supra note 128, at 2 ("[A] statute might be silent
with respect to a particular application because Congress simply did not anticipate the
situation."). An alternative explanation for the omission is that Congress considered the issue
but then decided to exclude a provision in the statute, either because they could not get a
political consensus to include it or because Congress believed judges would already cover the
issue by applying a canon. See id. at 1-2 (explaining that silence, "[v]ague or ambiguous
language might also be the result of compromise --· or [Congress] may have intended to delegate interpretive authority').
233. Sometimes Congress will enact a provision stating that a particular state statute is
not preempted. See. e.g., 49 U.S. C. § 14501(b)(2). In that case, it also seems unlikely that

Congress intended to preempt all other state laws. C{., e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). Instead,

Congress was most likely just including the state law it thought would be preempted without
giving thought to other state laws_
234. See Petroski, supra note 143, at 492.
235. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, lntersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as "Law"
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canons are law, under the notion that canons' established status
transforms them into statutory default rules that approximate
congressional preferences and drafting practices. 236 Justice Scalia
argued that once rules of interpretation ''have been long indulged,
they acquire a sort of prescriptive validity, since the legislature
presumably has them in mind when it chooses its language."237
These arguments essentially assume that the judicial canons are
implicit in each statute, and therefore function more or less as part
of the enacted text. 238
This Article's findings provide arguments against the idea that
judicial canons should have the weight of law, at least in some
circumstances. The fact that Congress increasingly enacts some
interpretive rules akin to canons should cause courts to question
whether unenacted canons should be treated the same as enacted
interpretive rules that Congress has regularly chosen to enact. It
seems that enacted rules, which are unquestionably law, should
have a more privileged place in interpretation. Yet, courts continue
to regularly give at least some judicial canons the weight of law as
if they were enacted, for example, by "struggl[ing] hard" to interpret
a statute in a way that comports with certain substantive canons. 239
and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1905 (2011); Gluck, Federal Common Law, supra
note 1, at 755-56; Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory
Interpretation Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863, 1866-67 (2008).

236. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 40, at 390 ("Many of the canons used by textualists reflect
observations about Congress's own habits.").
237. Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CAsE W. RsRV.
L. REv. 581, 583 (1990). Professar Manning similarly claimed that "to the extent that either
the canon of avoidance or any particular clear statement rule is well settled, its application
would perhaps follow from the textualists' practice of reading statutes in light of established
background conventions." Manning, supra note 46, at 125 (footnote omitted); see also id. at
113 C'Using such extra-textual conventions, provided that they are firmly established, does
not offend textualist premises.').
238. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 237, at 583. Textualists do not require that each legislator
actually be aware of these rules. Instead, textualists "assum[e] that a 'reasonable legislator'
knows or should know the social and linguistic practices of the ... legal community." John F.
Manniog, Chevron and the Reasonable Legislator, 128 HARV. L. REV. 457, 468 (2014); cf. Mark
Greenberg, Legislation as Communication? Legal Interpretation and the Study of Linguistic
Communication, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LANGUAGE IN LAW 217, 254 (Andrei
Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011) ("[T]he canons specify how legislation properly con·
tributes to the law, rather than what the legislature is likely to have intended as a matter of
actual psychologjcal fact.").
239. United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 110 (1801); see also United
States v. Heth, 7 U.S. (3 Craoch) 399, 414 (1806). Far a survey of the Court's deployment of

2048

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:1997

If judicial canons receive less weight in interpretation and are,
therefore, less likely to be dispositive in any case, then how will
judges come up with an interpretation? Judges need tools to help
them decide on an interpretation in each case. This question is
relevant to both textualist and purposivist judges because both
modes of interpretation give weight to canons. 240 Textualists, who
shun legislative history and look to canons as a supposedly neutral
and unbiased tool to interpret ambiguous statutes, would find a
reduced emphasis on canons especially problematic. 241 In addition
to canons, the most obvious interpretive tool for interpreting ambiguous statutory language is legislative history. Textualists criticize legislative history, arguing that legislative history is not law
and is subject to judicial and congressional manipulation that make
it untrustworthy.••• Textualists commonly oppose use oflegislative
history by arguing that Congress could include legislative history it
in the enacted text if it intends for courts to consider it. 243 But that
same line of reasoning could apply to canons Congress regularly enacts: if Congress wants a canon to apply, then it can say so through
the constitutionally prescribed process. If Congress does not include
a canon in the enacted text, then it could be argued under textualists' own reasoning that courts should not impose that same canon
under the guise of using neutral interpretive principles. If courts
essentially apply the same interpretive rule, with the same weight,
whether that rule is enacted or not, then what incentive does
Congress have to specify which rules it wants courts to apply?
At the very least, an argument could be made that canons and
legislative history should be viewed as tools of equal importanceneither is law and both are subject to judicial manipulation, as
substantive canons as strong clear statement rules that must be overcome to interpret a
statute in a manner that goes against the substantive canon, see generally William Eskridge
Jr. & Philip Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional
Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1992).
240. See, e.g., CONG. RBCH. SERV., THEORIES, supra note 128, at 10-18.
241. See Manning, supra note 48, at 1864-65.
242. See generally ScALIA& GARNER, supra note 1, at 369-90; John F. Manning, Textualism
as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 637, 679 (1997); Nelson, supra note 40, at
377.

243. See Eskridge, The New Textualism, supra note 54, at 623; Manning, supra note 242,
at 673, 679 (arguing that legislative history impermissibly allows Congress to delegate its
constitutionally prescribed enactment process to a subgroup within Congress).
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judges have the discretion to decide how and whether to use them.'44
If textualists continue to refuse to use legislative history and
instead rely extensively on canons to resolve ambiguity, they should
at least acknowledge that the canon serves a gap-filling role because
the court cannot determine how to interpret the ambiguity otherWise.
As an illustration of this approach, consider the canon that presumes that Congress does not impliedly repeal earlier statutes,
discussed above.'45 When Congress enacts a later law that does not
explicitly say whether it repeals an earlier law, what should courts
do? One option is for courts to assume that the ''new legislative
policy [should] be applied to full effect, liberally supplanting outdated prior statutes."246 Another option is for courts to interpret the
later law in whatever way necessary to save the earlier law. 247 The
latter approach appears to be the approach taken by most modern
courts. 248 As a leading casebook notes, "judges will usually strain to
reconcile federal statutes seemingly at odds" 249 and "it is almost
unheard offor federal judges to declare that a recent federal law has
implicitly repealed a previous one." 250
Under the current application of the presumption against implied
repeal canon, courts seek out an interpretation of the later law, even
if it is not the best interpretation, that allows as much of the earlier
law to stand as possible.'51 This Article's findings show that if
Congress intends for an earlier law to be preserved in the face of a

244. James J. Brudney, Canon Shortfalls and the Virtues of Political Branch Interpretive
Assets, 98 CALIF. L. REv. 1199, 1231-32 (2010) ("[A]lthough some judicial discretion is

essential and indeed salutary for the interpretive enterprise, judges who regularly rely on the
canons have license to employ a systemic kind of discretion, in contrast to judges who
regularly invoke legislative history.").
246. See supra notes 91-101 and accompanying text.
246. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 29, at 875.
247. See, e.g., Petroski, supra note 143, at 495.
248. Seeid.
249. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 29, at 875.
250. Id.; see also J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142
(2001) ("The rarity with which [the Court has] discovered implied repeals is due to the relatively stringent standard for such findings, namely, that there be an irreconcilable conflict
between the two federal statutes at issue." (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein,
516 u.s. 367, 381 (1996))).
251. See Petroski, supra note 143, at 516.
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later law, it can (and increasingly does) explicitly say so.' 62 Therefore, this presumption against implied repeal looks less like a
reflection of what the enacting Congress intended, especially in
more recent statutes, and more like a judicial creation based on
something other than congressional intent. This canon is sometimes
justified on the grounds of creating "whole-code coherence."263
Although this might be a valid reason to apply the canon, a judge
basing a decision on this canon should acknowledge that the decision is based on judicial values rather than congressional intent.
A similar approach would make sense for other canons discussed
above. For example, courts are often unclear about the meaning and
scope of the presumption against preemption, 264 but that canon is
most commonly applied to construe statutes that could preempt
state law narrowly to avoid preemption.'55 In other words, courts
are willing to bend the plain meaning ofthe statute to fit the canon.
This Article's findings provide a reason to question whether the
canon should serve such a substantial role in interpretation. If Congress is concerned about the potential of a court interpreting a law
to preempt state laws, it is capable of addressing that concern in the
text of the statute. If Congress fails to address preemption, then a
court straining to give the text an interpretation that avoids preempting state law requires justification other than congressional
intent. Perhaps the canon is most justified as a simple tiebreaker
when the text has equally plausible interpretations, not as a rule
that courts use to overcome the most natural interpretation of the
text. Either way, judges should be explicit about the role the canon
is playing.
CONCLUSION

In recent decades, the debate over the use of canons has become
a central issue in interpretation. Many scholars and judges continue
to debate the use of canons, and many argue that Congress should
resolve the debate conclusively by specifying which interpretive
252. See supra Table 4.

253. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 29, at 868.
254. MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 34, at 288.

255. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 290.
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rules it intends courts to apply. This Article provides an important
insight into these debates by showing that Congress has already
enacted thousands of interpretive rules throughout the Code, and
has increasingly done so in recent decades. This Article's findings
demonstrate that our understanding of how Congress legislates is
still incomplete. Congress's laws are eclectic, but we can benefit
from looking at the entire Code for clues about how Congress drafts
and generates its intent.
This Article opens a new empirical perspective into congressional drafting, but one article is not enough to conclusively answer
what this should mean for interpretation. Many unanswered questions remain: Why does Congress create rules of interpretation?
What differences exist within Congress over their use? Who is Congress speaking to when it uses these rules? One article can only do
so much-and there is much we still need to know about how Congress legislates. This Article provides a starting point and a path
forward toward understanding how Congress thinks about the rules
that should apply to the interpretation of its statutes.
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APPENDIX

A. Description of Searches for Rules of Interpretation in the
U.S. Code"66

For the years 1994 and 2017, we used the U.S. Code files available on govinfo.gov. To access a specific title of the Code for a given
year, we used govinfo.gov's API and the requests library in Python
to read in the corresponding HTML file for the year and title. 257 The
use of HTML files allowed us to search the Code using both in-text
keywords and HTML tag identifiers.
In web design, HTML code is used to define the structure and
layout of a web page. When displaying a body of text, each heading,
subheading, and section of the body (typically no more than the
length of a paragraph) is given an HTML formatting tag. 258 Each
HTML tag is named according to its hierarchical position within
the body of text and can contain a wide variety of attributes that
describe or modify the text contained in the tag. In our analysis, we
relied heavily on the "class" attribute of the HTML tags to identify
whether a given part of the Code was in the notes or the main body
of the Code. The "class" attribute also allowed us to determine
whether a given instance of a phrase occurred in the headings of
the Code or the body of the Code.
To analyze these HTML files, we created a program using Python
3.0 software that read all titles of the Code for a given year, parsed
out each distinct rule of interpretation for each title, and then wrote
information about each rule to an Excel file. The resulting Excel file
contained the title number, section heading, and text of each rule
of interpretation as well as an indicator for whether the rule was
found in the notes or the body of the Code.
256. The full record of the Author's research results is on file with the Author.
257. New govinfo API, GOVINFO (Oct. 22, 2018), https:llwww.govinfo.gov/features/api
[https:l/perma.cc/J7JR-FZAL]; Requests: HITP for HumansTM, PYTHON, https:l/2.pythonrequests.org/en/masterl [https:llperma.cci28F9-SHJH].
258. See Ben Lutkevich, HTML (Hypertext Markup Language), THE SEEVEEBIDE, https:/1
www. theserverside.comldefmition/HTML-Hypertext-Markup-Language [https://perma.ccl
ZQ3R-5AU8].
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For each title of the Code, we first used the Beautiful Soup
Python library to parse the title by HTML tag. 259 We then searched
the text of the title for "construe," ''rule(s) of construction," "rule(s)
of interpretation," and "interpreted," ignoring case in each instance.
For each search, we created a list of HTML tags that contained text
matching the search word or phrase. We then iterated through this
list and discarded all tags that were found in the table of contents
of the title. For the remaining tags, we considered four different
cases:
1) tags found in the headings of the title (denoted by their "class"
attribute) that were immediately followed by a list (ordered text
beginning with (i), (l), (a), (A), or (1));
2) tags found in the headings ofthe title that were not immedi·
ately followed by a list or a subheading;
3) tags found in the headings of the title that were immediately
followed by a subheading; and
4) tags found in the body of the title.
For the first case, we replaced the heading tag in our list with the
tags of all of its subsequent list items. For the second case, we replaced the heading tag with the next subsequent body tag. For the
third case, we gathered all subheading tags under the heading tag
and then either applied the procedure for case 1 or case 2 to each
subheading tag, depending on whether it was immediately followed
by a list. Finally, for the fourth case, we simply kept the body tag in
our list. We repeated this method for all four search terms, adding
tags from subsequent searches to our list only if the tags were not
already contained in the list.
Next, we considered instances in which the text of a given tag
ended with "construed as," "construed to," "construed," or "affect,"
followed by either a colon or an em dash. In the Code, such instances are typically followed by a list of items that can each be
considered as a separate rule of interpretation. For this reason, in
these cases we replaced such tags with their subsequent list items.
In this way, we compiled a list of tags representing each rule of
259. Beautiful Soup Documentation, CRUMMY, https:/lwww.crummy.com/software/Beau
tifu!Souplbs4/dod [https://perma.cc/MUZ7-89NB].
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interpretation in the title that had no duplicates and contained only
body tags.
For each tag in our list, we recorded the section heading for the
tag, whether it was in the notes of the title, and the text of the rule
of interpretation it represented. To gather the correct amount of
text for each rule of interpretation, we considered four cases:
1) tags whose text was a list item in a list immediately following
text ending with "construed as," "construed to," "construed," or
"affect," followed by either a colon or an em dash that were
immediately followed by another list;
2) tags whose text was a list item in a list immediately following
text ending with "construed as," "construed to," "construed," or
"affect," followed by either a colon or an em dash that were not
immediately followed by another list;
3) tags whose text was not a list item in a list immediately
following text ending with "construed as," "construed to,"
"construed," or "affect," followed by either a colon or an em dash
that were immediately followed by another list; and
4) tags whose text was not a list item in a list immediately
following text ending with "construed as," "construed to,"
"construed," or "affect," followed by either a colon or an em dash
that were not immediately followed by another list.

For the first case, we included the entire text that ended with
"construed as,'' "construed to,'' "construed,'' or "affect,'' followed by
either a colon or an em dash, the text of the tag itself, and the text
of all subsequent list items following the tag. For the second case,
we included the entire text that ended with "construed as,''
"construed to," "construed," or "affect," followed by either a colon or
an em dash and the text of the tag itself. For the third case, we
included the text of the tag itself and the text of all subsequent list
items following the tag. Finally, for the fourth case, we included
only the text of the tag itself. Additionally, in all cases we included
the text of the first heading tag immediately preceding the rule of
interpretation at the beginning.
For the years 1946 and 1970, we used text files of the U.S. Code
obtained from Hein Online. Unlike the text in the HTML files we
used for the 1994 and 2017 versions of the Code, the text in these
files was not neatly separated into sections by HTML tag. Because
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we could not rely on HTML tags to separate out the text in sections,
we delimited sections of text by sentence.
For a given search term, we extracted each sentence of text in
which the term occurred and treated these sentences as separate
rules of interpretation. If a sentence was immediately followed by
a list (ordered text beginning with (i), (I), (a), (A), or (1)), we also
included the text from the list as part of the rule of interpretation.
Just as with the 1994 and 2017 versions of the Code, we used
"construe," "rule(s) of construction," "rule(s) of interpretation," and
"interpreted'' as search terms. However, without HTML tags, we
were unable to collect data on the title number, section heading,
and whether a given rule was found in the notes or the body of the
Code. Instead, we merely wrote the text of each rule of interpretation to an Excel file.

B. Other Searches of the U.S. Code
We performed the following searches ofthe 1946, 1970, 1994, and
2017 versions of the U.S. Code in a similar manner to the way that
we searched each of these versions of the Code for "construe,"
"rule(s) of construction," "rule(s) of interpretation," and ''interpreted":
1) ''private right of action" or ''private remedies";
2) "common law'';
3) ''has the meaning'' or ''have the meaning'';
4) "severability " "held invalid " "unenforceable " or
'
'
'
"separability''; and
5) "sovereign immunity."

For each of these searches, we went through and weeded out false
positives by hand that did not match the type of interpretive rule we
sought.

